"Reconstruction" and "Modernization": West German Social History during the 1950s

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Introduction

Exactly when "the fifties" took on the quality of a distinct era in public memory is not certain. The first retrospective assessments of the 1950s in the early 1970s, which sought to move beyond contemporary commentaries on the "end of the postwar period" or "the Adenauer era,"[1] still focused largely on national political events. "Germany was divisible," commented Thilo Koch in 1972, summarizing his multipart television series on "the 1950s in Germany."[2] Soon thereafter, however, nostalgia must have set in. As early as 1978 a title story in the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*[3] described the "longing for the counterfeit fifties" ("Heimweh nach den falschen Fünfzigern"); the story expressed a critical political undertone, which had been part of virtually every portrayal of the Federal Republic as a "CDU-State" since the 1960s.[4] Cataloging the phenomena of the 1950s, the article in *Der Spiegel* named all the characteris-

This chapter emerged from a research project funded by the Volkswagen Foundation (Volkswagen Stiftung) at the University of Hamburg's Historical Seminar entitled: "'Modernity' and 'Modernization' in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s." In addition to the authors, Thomas Südbeck (research focus: motorization, transportation infrastructure and policies) and Michael Wildt (research focus: nutrition and consumption) collaborated on this project. The chapter includes passages from the unpublished project proposal (1986) as well as several internal working papers. Because of space constraints, citations have been limited to supporting evidence and a few references to more recent literature. (The translation was prepared by the editor with the assistance of Corinne Antezana-Pernet and Rita B. Bashaw.)

1. For an example of a balanced assessment, see Karl Dietrich Bracher, ed., *Nach 25 Jahren: Eine Deutschlandbilanz* (Munich, 1970).
2. Thilo Koch, *Deutschland war teilbar: Die Fünfziger Jahre* (Stuttgart, 1972).
3. *Der Spiegel*, no. 14 (1978).
4. See Gert Schäfer and Carl Nedelmann, eds., *Der CDU Staat: Analysen zur Verfas-*

tics that continued to lend a sense of fascination to the decade: fashion trends and architecture, the cinema and its stars, popular music, literature, and, last but not least, various philosophical tendencies.[5]

This fascination with the 1950s incorporates a mix of intellectual interest and the naive joy of discovery, as well as the calculations of those who seek to market the culture and lifestyle of the decade. In contrast, consideration of what motivated youth protest or later the *Null-Bock* (rejection of ambition) and "No-future" attitudes of the younger generation is eclipsed by an emphasis on the accomplishments of the generation, the grandparents of today, who rebuilt Germany, and by a focus on how things got better and better in the 1950s. The new women's movement has also been unable to find positive historical models in the 1950s.[6] For a moment, there was a provocative tendency to characterize the 1950s, politically and historically, as the "puberty of the republic," but this moment came and went.[7] Now, cultural history is "in," and to a certain extent aesthetic and anthropological approaches have pushed aside the methodologies of political scientists and sociologists. Only via a detour of discussions of "modernity" and "postmodernity," first in the history of aesthetics and style, have we once again begun to consider social and economic dimensions, stressing that the 1950s were a "period of modernity."

Traveling along different paths, historians have begun to arrive at the point where they are offering similar assessments of the period. In the 1970s, the thesis of "West German Restoration" was still widely held;[8] originating in the 1950s, this thesis made it possible for leftist intellectuals and politicians (from Walter Dirks to Kurt Schumacher) to understand the gap between their expectations and the reality of developments after the collapse in 1945.[9] In

sungswirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik (Munich, 1967).

5. Among the more recent overviews that offer a range of perspectives on cultural history, see Hermann Glaser, *Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. 2, *Zwischen Grundgesetz und Großer Koalition 1949–1967* (Munich, 1986); Jost Hermand, *Kultur im Wiederaufbau: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1965* (Munich, 1986); quite descriptive also is Dieter Bänsch, ed., *Die Fünfziger Jahre: Beiträge zu Politik und Kultur* (Tübingen, 1985); worth noting in the flood of publications about specific sectors of cultural development are, on fashion and design, Thomas Jasperson, *Produktwahrnehmung und stilistischer Wandel* (Frankfurt, 1985); on architecture, Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, *Architektur und Städtebau der fünfziger Jahre* (Bonn, 1987); on literature, Ludwig Fischer, ed., *Literatur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1967* (Munich, 1986).

6. See Anette Kuhn's preface in Doris Schubert, *Frauen in der deutschen Nachkriegszeit*, vol. 1, *Frauenarbeit 1945–1949: Quellen und Materialien* (Düsseldorf, 1984), 13–21.

7. See Nikolaus Jungwirth and Gerhard Kromschröder, *Die Pubertät der Republik: Die 50er Jahre der Deutschen* (Frankfurt, 1978); and Eckhard Siepmann, ed., *Bikini: Die Fünfziger Jahre: Kalter Krieg und Capri-Sonne* (Berlin, 1981).

8. See in particular Ernst-Ulrich Huster et al., *Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945–1949* (Frankfurt, 1972).

9. See Karl Prümm, "Entwürfe einer zweiten Republik: Zukunftsprogramme in den 'Frankfurter Heften' 1946–1949," in *Deutschland nach Hitler: Zukunftspläne im Exil und aus der*

1981 Hans-Peter Schwarz, the Adenauer biographer and historian of the Federal Republic, countered that what characterized the 1950s was not "restoration" but "modernization"; the 1950s, he argued, constituted an "era of dramatic modernization."[10] To be sure, Schwarz did not specify exactly what belonged under the umbrella of "modernization"; for him, the concept remained just as vague as it was for Ralf Dahrendorf and David Schoenbaum in their explanations of National Socialism's rise to dominance and the Weimar Republic's disintegration.[11]

"Modernization under a conservative guardianship"[12]—this formulation may ultimately best summarize the Adenauer era. However, we must first determine more precisely what constitutes "modernization." The "modernization theories" that circulated in the 1960s are of little use; like the "modernization" discussions among historians, they almost always were based on the analysis of the transition from agrarian to industrial society.[13] More recently, historians have convincingly labeled conditions in the Weimar Republic as "modern," using as a measure Weimar's social institutions and the development of the welfare state. The meaning of *modernity* in this instance is borrowed from contemporary sociologists (especially Max Weber).[14] From this perspective, the years after 1933 can be interpreted primarily as an unhealthy ("pathological") development of "modernity," though this framework offers no adequate explanation of the internal dynamics of specific aspects of social, political, and economic development.

Recent historical and sociological analyses have offered a convincing case for viewing the period from the end of World War I until the end of the 1960s as a unity,[15] identified as the "structural breakthrough of modernity" (*Strukturbruch der Moderne*);[16] this framework makes it impossible to exclude the years of the "Third Reich" from a social history of "modernity." Much his-

Besatzungszeit 1939–1949, edited by Thomas Koebner et al., (Opladen, 1987), 330–43.

10. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre der Republik 1949–1957* (Stuttgart, 1981), 382; also idem, "Modernisierung oder Restauration? Einige Vorfragen zur künftigen Sozialgeschichtsforschung über die Ära Adenauer," in *Rheinland-Westfalen im Industriezeitalter*, vol. 3, *Vom Ende der Weimarer Republik bis zum Land Nordrhein-Westfalen*, edited by Kurt Düwell and Wolfgang Köllmann (Wuppertal, 1984), 278–93.

11. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich, 1965); David Schoenbaum, *Die braune Revolution: Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reiches* (Cologne, 1968).

12. Christoph Kleßmann, "Ein stolzes Schiff und krächzende Möwen: Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik und ihre Kritiker," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11 (1985): 485.

13. In particular, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1975).

14. Detlev J. Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt, 1987).

15. This characterization also holds for the history of architecture, city planning, and housing. See, for example, Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *"Massenwohnung" und "Eigenheim": Wohnungsbau und Wohnen in der Großstadt seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt, 1988).

16. Ulrich Beck, *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* (Frankfurt, 1987).

torical discussion has questioned whether 1933 should be seen as a political rupture, and recent research into the life histories of the postwar "reconstruction" generation (*"Wiederaufbau"-Generation*) has allowed us to conceive of the decades from 1930 to 1960 as a unity; this perspective has been particularly useful for the social historical understanding of the Adenauer era.[17]

For a German social history that spans political turning points, however, there are still many areas that have not been adequately studied. There are some breaks that cannot be glossed over so easily. World War II, the collapse, and the division of Germany tore apart the fabric of social and economic interrelationships. For example, we can point to the anticlimactic disappearance of the influential east Elbian Junkers, who had been such an anachronistic presence in the political culture of the Weimar Republic; this development has received virtually no scholarly attention. In addition, changes that register in economic data, though at first glance far less dramatic, have crucial implications for historical analysis. The west German economy of today is structured differently internally and is tied differently into the global economy than the pre-1945 regional and national economy from which it emerged; long-term statistical data for production and distribution make possible long-term comparisons over decades, and they can shed light on business management practices, but they do not illuminate economic history more broadly conceived.[18] How, for example, can we accurately assess the significance of state support for economic innovation in the 1950s if we do not locate it in the context of long-term developmental trends? The origins of the peaceful development of atomic energy in the 1950s is a case in point, one of the few areas of economic policy development that has been the subject of systematic analysis.[19]

In short, much remains to be done before we can start to offer an adequate picture of the "modernization" and "modernity" of West German society in the 1950s. In what follows, we offer an outline for future research that will make it possible to fill in this picture more completely:

We must first inquire about the relationship between "reconstruction" (*"Rekonstruktion"*) and "expansion" (*"Ausbau"*) of West Germany society. In historical overviews, 1955 roughly marks the end of "reconstruction," that is, of "restoration," and the start of "expansion,"

17. See in particular the volumes of the project *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930–1960*, edited by Lutz Niethammer.

18. See the preface of Walther G. Hoffmann, *Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1965.)

19. Joachim Radkau, *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft 1945–1975: Verdrängte Alternativen in der Kerntechnik und der Ursprung der nuklearen Kontroverse* (Reinbek, 1983).

already characterized by contemporaries as the beginning of "modernization."[20] This two-phase model makes it possible to understand macroeconomic data, but it does not address the question of when exactly political, administrative, economic and social "planners" began to make use of the concept of "expansion." In addition, the relationship between "reconstruction" and "modernization" in the "restoration" process of the first half of the 1950s requires clarification.[21]

Second, the term reconstruction takes as a point of reference standards in place before 1945, underscoring the need to sort out the significance of long-term factors of continuity.[22] Despite all the myths about the unprecedented nature of postwar growth and prosperity, the level of technological development of industry in prewar German society was high (this was also true of certain sectors during wartime). In addition, the standard of living and level of social security in German society ranked at the top of industrial societies, despite the disruption caused by the world economic crisis and the "Third Reich." Indeed, from this perspective, the social development of the 1950s emerges as the resumption of trends that were interrupted by the destruction during World War II and the changes that took place in the postwar years. In addition, we also now know that under National Socialist rule, there were already elements of "modernity" experienced in daily life—from laundry detergent to Coca-Cola—that would intensify after the war.[23]

In the initial postwar years, the society of the Federal Republic was exposed to models of political culture and patterns of everyday life that

20. See, for example, Konrad Adenauer's opening address to the second legislative session of the West German parliament, October 20, 1953, in Hans Ulrich Behn, *Die Regierungserklärungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich, 1971).

21. State-subsidized housing development may serve as another example; here we can also find discussions of "modern" (i.e., rational) construction and housing. See the contributions in the richly illustrated catalog of Bernhard Schulz, ed., *Grauzonen, Farbwelten: Kunst und Zeitbilder 1945–1955* (Berlin, 1983); for a case study, Axel Schildt, *Die Grindelhochhäuser: Eine Sozialgeschichte der ersten deutschen Wohnhochhausanlage, Hamburg 1945–1956* (Hamburg, 1988); on the largely overlooked tradition of "modern" mass housing developments, Tilman Harlander and Gerhard Fehl, eds., *Hitler's sozialer Wohnungsbau 1940–1945: Wohnungspolitik, Baugestaltung und Siedlungsplanung* (Hamburg, 1986); on city planning and reconstruction in the 1940s, Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, *Träume in Trümmern: Planungen zum Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte in Westdeutschland 1940–1950* (Braunschweig, 1988); and Klaus von Beyme, *Der Wiederaufbau: Architektur und Städtebaupolitik in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Munich, 1987).

22. See the contributions in Ludolf Herbst, ed., *Westdeutschland 1945–1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration* (Munich, 1986); and more recently Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dieter Henke, Hans Woller, eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich, 1988).

23. See the somewhat overstated position of Hans-Dietrich Schäfer, *Das gespaltene Bewußtsein: Über deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933–1945* (Munich, 1981).

came from other Western industrial societies, particularly the United States. This took the form of the occupation forces' early attempts to bring about a "reeducation," then a "reorientation" to democracy. The opening of the West German economy to the world market, which soon followed, was another part of this process. Even at the time, many contemporaries labeled these developments "Americanization."[24] Thus, a third focus of research must be the assessment of the actual significance of these outside impulses for the development of the Federal Republic in the 1950s. To be sure, some individual aspects of economic and political relations have already been investigated.[25] However, studies of "Americanization" must also consider the extent to which postwar trends represented the resumption of patterns interrupted by the war; it is generally known that a first wave of "Americanization" took place in the 1920s.[26]

The two-phase model of development outlined here also offers a way in which to differentiate among different phases of "modernization." The contemporary characterization of the entire decade as "modern" is clearly an exaggeration; it appears that this label often meant little more than "new," "fashionable," or, in any case, "up-to-date"; it was a default category that could indicate many things. For example, a certain austerity in fashions and patterns of daily life might be interpreted as "modern"—the expression of a new style and aesthetic—in a society in which affluence was still measured on the yardstick of bourgeois excess, although this austerity was in fact an expression of thrift determined by scarcity. Particularly for those who lost all their possessions and often their social status through flight, expulsion, and bombing raids, the use of such labels was a way to facilitate their integration into new surroundings. The publicly subsidized housing projects that began to appear in many places in the 1950s offer another example that could be used to illustrate this point: Identifying these housing projects as representative of "modern times" was a way to displace traditional notions of taste, still the province of the more affluent classes, though it was precisely in these upper social classes that the "modern" had been "avant-garde." In addition, "modern" styles had

24. For a summary of the state of research, see Harald Guldin, "Außenwirtschaftspolitische und außenpolitische Einflußfaktoren im Prozeß der Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1947–1952)," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 32/87, 3–20.

25. See Werner Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute 1945–1975: Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen* (Düsseldorf, 1978); and Hans Jürgen Grabbe, *Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945–1960* (Düsseldorf, 1983).

26. On the economic and political linkages between Germany and America since 1918, see, for example, Manfred Knapp, *Die USA und Deutschland 1918–1975: Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft* (Munich, 1978).

been officially taboo in the "Third Reich" as they were for many years in the German Democratic Republic; this, in turn, offered a political justification for favoring such "modern" styles in the West in the 1950s.

Patterns of Economic Development

Perhaps it is appropriate to begin a history of West German society's "modernization" in the 1950s with a consideration of particular patterns of economic development. The growth of the German economy in the 1950s was a source of fascination for contemporaries, and it has continued to fascinate those who have studied the decade.[27] Figures commonly used to measure the "singularity" of this "economic miracle"—for example, the tripling of the GNP between 1950 and 1960—can provide only a limited sense of the dynamism which set the Federal Republic at the forefront of Western European economies, surpassed in growth worldwide only by Japan. Perhaps a better sense of this dynamic development is possible if we recall the widespread concern about continued unemployment that existed at the beginning of the decade, replaced by the late 1950s by labor shortages: The number of those employed increased by 25 percent between 1950 and 1960, from twenty to twenty-five million. Even the majority of expellees and refugees, whose economic integration had initially been viewed as a burden, found employment. Newcomers from the GDR were soon welcome, and ultimately the East German state put a halt to this labor migration, enticed by the development of West Germany society, only by building the Berlin Wall (1961). Recruitment of guest workers from southern countries, which had already begun before the building of the wall, could only partially replace this influx of mostly skilled labor.[28]

27. See, for example, Elmar Altvater et al., *Vom Wirtschaftswunder zur Wirtschaftskrise: Ökonomie und Politik in der Bundesrepublik* (Berlin, 1979); Gerold Ambrosius, "Das Wirtschaftssystem," in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. 2, edited by Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt, 1983), 238–97; Knut Borchardt, "Die Bundesrepublik in den säkularen Trends der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung," in *Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beiträge zum Kontinuitätsproblem*, edited by Werner Conze and M. Rainer Lepsius (Stuttgart, 1983), 20–45; Werner Abelshauser, *Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1966* (Düsseldorf, 1987); for international comparisons, see Herman van der Wee, *Der gebremste Wohlstand: Wiederaufbau, Wachstum, Strukturwandel 1945–1980* (Munich, 1984); and for a provocative global interpretation, Burkart Lutz, *Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität: Eine Neuinterpretation der industriell-kapitalistischen Entwicklung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt, 1984).

28. Detailed figures are available in Siegfried Bethlehem, *Heimatvertreibung, DDR-Flucht, Gastarbeiterzuwanderung: Wanderungsströme und Wanderungspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1982); see also Marion Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen: Hemmnisse und Wege ihrer Integration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin, 1987); and Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie-Lewien, and Helga Grebing, eds., *Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte: Bilanzierung der Forschung und Perspektiven für die künftige Forschungsarbeit* (Hildesheim, 1987).

The highly skilled nature of the German labor force, compared with other countries, was an important precondition for the German "economic miracle" in east and west, though this was not immediately recognized. Initially, the rapid economic development was seen as a more-or-less necessary consequence of the market economy that went into effect with currency reform in 1948. Subsequently, historians determined that the level of West German industrial capital stock was 10 percent higher than before the war, despite dismantling and the destruction experienced during the war.[29] They began to question whether American credit introduced by the Marshall Plan at the same time as currency reform in 1948 was necessary to jump-start West German economic development.[30] Apart from its positive psychological effect on the economy, there is little doubt that the Marshall Plan laid the groundwork for the West German capacity to enter strong foreign trade relationships. Once currency reform was in place and the fundamental administrative and political decisions of 1948 had been made, it was possible for the export of West German goods to become a significant pacesetter for economic development in the 1950s. Until the Korean War increased worldwide demand for German goods, particularly those of highly centralized sectors like iron and steel, the Allies maintained postwar restrictions on German industrial production; the suspension of these restrictions made possible the full exploitation of production capacity in these sectors. By 1952, the Federal Republic boasted a trade surplus. By 1960, the West German economy's exports represented 17 percent of the net national product; exports had reached approximately the pre–World War I levels of imperial Germany.[31] In the years that followed, the value of exports grew, reaching 25 percent of the net national product by 1970. The structure of exports was distinctive: In terms of value, finished industrial products in 1960 represented 82.4 percent of all exports (1950: 64.8 percent).[32] To an even greater extent than the Kaiserreich, the Federal Republic had become a country of finishing and processing industries.

The statistics mirror this "industrial miracle"[33] in many different ways: On average, between 1950 and 1960 the industrial and manufacturing ("secondary") sector of the economy grew 9.5 percent annually, while the agricultural ("primary") sector and the service ("tertiary") sector grew at aver-

29. See, for example, Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948: Rekonstruktion und Wachstumbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone* (Stuttgart, 1975).

30. This is the subject of an ongoing debate in the pages of the journal *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.*

31. Among others, see Hoffmann, *Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft,* 151.

32. Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft 1872–1972* (Stuttgart, 1972), 196.

33. According to Dieter Mertens, *Die Wandlungen der industriellen Branchenstruktur in der Bundesrepublik 1950–1960* (Berlin, 1964), 23.

age yearly rates of 3.9 percent and 6.35 percent, respectively.[34] In 1960, industry contributed far more than 50 percent of the GNP, and measured along this scale, the Federal Republic stood at the top of Western European industrial societies.[35] This development is even more striking if we examine the distribution of the labor force: In the primary sector, the number of employed between 1950 and 1960 decreased by 1.4 million (a yearly average of 2.7 percent); in the secondary sector, employment increased by 3.4 million (a yearly average of 3.4 percent).[36] The tertiary sector grew by about the same amount as the secondary. Never before in German history had there been a comparable period of rapid change in the structure of employment. It has been calculated that in these years one-sixth of the increase in West Germany's economic productivity resulted from the transfer of employment from less productive sectors—such as agriculture—into sectors that already exhibited higher rates of productivity.[37]

Despite a decline in employment, mechanization and motorization were responsible for productivity gains in the agricultural sector as well, an indication that there was more than one way to stimulate the growth of the national economy. Despite Nazi propaganda, in the "Third Reich" agriculture received little significant support in comparison to industry; as a result, measured in terms of the extent of motorized machines, agriculture in the 1950s was a good twenty years behind the times and below the average of other comparable national economies. Friedrich Wilhelm Henning correctly identified the 1950s as the "beginning of the modern era for the agrarian sector."[38] In the industrial sector, the number of jobs that demanded highly skilled, better qualified workers also expanded, and the share of workers performing hard physical labor fell, triggering the earliest discussions of the "social consequences of automation".[39]

34. See Werner Glastetter, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zeitraum 1950–1975* (Berlin, 1977), 37f.

35. See Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, *Mut zur Stabilisierung: Jahresgutachten 1973–74* (Stuttgart, 1973), 25.

36. For example, see the extensive statistical material available in Martin Osterland et al., *Materialien zur Lebens- und Arbeitssituation der Industriearbeiter in der BRD,* 3d ed. (Frankfurt, 1973).

37. See Peter Schwanse, *Beschäftigungsstruktur und Wirtschaftswachstum in der Bundesrepublik 1950–1963* (Berlin, 1965); also Karl-Heinrich Oppenländer, "Wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Wandel durch technischen Fortschritt: Überblick und Ausblick," in *Wirtschaftlicher und technischen Fortschritt: Bericht über den wissenschaftlichen Teil der 34. Mitgliederversammlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute e.V.,* May 22, 1971 (supplement to *Konjunkturpolitik* [18]), 11–70.

38. Friedrich Wilhelm Henning, "Der Beginn der modernen Welt im agrarischen Bereich," in *Studien zum Beginn der modernen Gesellschaft,* edited by Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart, 1974), 114.

39. See Helmut Schelsky, *Die sozialen Folgen der Automatisierung* (Düsseldorf, 1957). Many of the studies by industrial sociologists are mentioned in Rene König, ed., *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung,* vol. 8, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1977), 101–262; see also Johannes Weyer,

In the 1950s, the relative shares of industrial sectors shifted. Significant growth occurred primarily in industries of capital goods investment. The "growth industries" of this era were primarily oil refining, chemicals, production and processing of synthetics, the automotive industry, and (as it remains today) the electronics industry.[40] There is still no research into the extent to which domestic or foreign demand stimulated the growth of individual industrial sectors. The significance of domestic demand becomes apparent in the following sections that describe a society characterized by "mobility," "consumption," and "leisure."

The "Mobile" Society

When we speak of "mobility" or "mobilized society," we are referring both to spatial mobility—that is, migrations and changes of place of residence—and social mobility—that is, movement upward and downward in terms of social status. In the 1950s these processes were often inseparably intertwined. In the early postwar years, expellees, refugees, and returning POWs shaped contemporaries' picture of society. For Elisabeth Pfeil, writing in 1948, the refugee was the ideal-typical figure that embodied the spirit of the era.[41] And investigating the decline in social status of many refugees, Helmut Schelsky discerned a trend toward a "leveled-off middle class society" (*nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft*), a view that served for many years as a popular framework for interpreting social development.[42] To be sure, geographic mobility quickly diminished. In the mid-1950s, statisticians began to speak of the tendency to "settle down" in the "new home" (*neue Heimat*), especially among refugees and expellees. The last great population shifts of expellees within the Federal Republic took place between 1953 and 1956. These occurred in response to targeted resettlement programs that offered solid prospects for jobs and housing in newly built apartments. Since 1956, there has been a resumption of a major trend of declining migration that could be traced back to World War I, interrupted only by World War II. In 1950, for every 1,000 inhabitants, there were 61.7 changes of residence; the number declined to 60.7 in 1960. One-third of these were moves between the various West German federal

Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945–1960: Deutsche Kontinuitäten und nordamerikanischer Einfluß (Berlin, 1984), 207ff.

40. For the first half of the 1950s, see the detailed statistical data in Klaus Leist, *Investitionen und Sozialstruktur in Westdeutschland* (Zürich, 1956), 56ff.; and in general, Bernhard Schäfer, *Sozialstruktur und Wandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1976), 141ff.

41. Elisabeth Pfeil, *Der Flüchtling: Gestalt einer Zeitenwende* (Hamburg, 1948).

42. First mentioned in Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart: Darstellung und Deutung einer empirisch-soziologischen Tatbestandsaufnahme* (Dortmund, 1953).

states; two-thirds occurred within state boundaries.[43] However, there was a clear increase in a special category of spatial mobility, that of "work-related commuting" (*Berufspendlertum*). In 1961, more than 30 percent of those employed did not live and work in the same place. In the preceding decade, the number of commuting workers, more than six million, had almost doubled.[44] This trend held true for urban areas such as Hamburg and for larger states with fewer big cities such as Bavaria.[45]

Compared to figures for the prewar period, the increase in the number of workers commuting was great. However, in order to understand this development, it is necessary to distinguish among different phases in the 1950s. At the beginning of the decade, local housing shortages in areas with many employment opportunities may have been the main cause of "commuting." However, in the years that followed, the reasons for commuting changed. The increasingly urban character of the entire society was one of the most significant consequences of industrial growth.[46] This was reflected in housing construction, heavily supported by the state, particularly in small and middle-size cities with populations of five thousand to fifty thousand inhabitants. It registered as well in the spread of industry and manufacturing into rural areas, a development that left contemporaries in a state of "complete amazement."[47] These consequences of industrial expansion completely altered patterns of mobility. The commuter was the symbol of urbanization, and it was the commuter who was particularly prominent among the class of new home owners that was part and parcel of the process of urbanization. By 1960, half of all commuting households owned "their own four walls." This was also a result of the second housing law, passed in 1956, that introduced measures to facilitate home ownership.[48] After years of housing shortages, it was far easier to satisfy the strong desire for individual home ownership in rural areas and on the outskirts—rather than in the center—of cities.

43. See Karl Schwarz, *Analyse der räumlichen Bevölkerungsbewegung* (Hannover, 1969), 80.

44. *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (1964): 216f.

45. For Hamburg, see the analysis of the area within a radius of 40 kilometers of the city, *Hamburg in Zahlen*, Sonderheft 2 (1963), 12; for Bavaria, Kurt Horstmann, "Zur Soziologie der Wanderungen," in *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung*, vol. 5, 2d ed., edited by Rene König (Stuttgart, 1976), 135.

46. For the first attempt at an overview of this still much-neglected aspect of social history, see Jürgen Reulecke, *Geschichte der Urbanisierung in Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1985).

47. Kurt Pritzkoleit, *Das gebändigte Chaos: Die deutschen Wirtschaftslandschaften* (Vienna, 1965), 9; for a sophisticated contemporary anthropological perspective, see also Hermann Bausinger, *Volkskultur in der technischen Welt* (Stuttgart, 1971) (new edition Frankfurt, 1986).

48. See Günther Schulz, "Eigenheimpolitik und Eigenheimförderung im ersten Jahrzehnt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," Schildt and Sywottek, *"Massenwohnung" und "Eigenheim,"* 409–39.

Greatly intensified automobile traffic and a notable increase in the number of automobiles were consequences of this trend toward "settling down" in areas removed from the center of cities; when contemporaries spoke of "mobility," they most often had in mind car travel. A particularly powerful indication of these changing forms of mobility is offered by a look at the shifting relationship between public and private modes of transport: Between 1950 and 1961, the number of passengers served by public transportation grew by 32 percent to 7.2 billion riders.[49] In 1961, streetcars and subways still served more passengers than any other form of transportation. However, between 1950 and 1961, the share of *all* riders carried by these modes of public transportation declined from 58 percent to 41 percent. Beginning in 1957, the number of persons served by railway decreased as well, from about 27 percent (1950) to 18.5 percent (1961). Buses alone showed an increase in ridership; in 1961, they transported two-and-one-half times more people than in 1950, reflecting the rapid development of the transportation infrastructure and a demand for new branchlines.

After 1957, the number of riders using public transportation continued to increase, but at diminishing rates, and individual use of automobiles began to take on a new quality. In that year, there were more registered automobiles than motorcycles on West German streets (excluding mopeds, which were beginning to replace bicycles) for the first time. New registrations for automobiles had outnumbered those for motorcycles for the first time three years earlier. At over 2 million in 1955, the number of motorcycles had more than doubled since 1950, but it then declined to 1.5 million by 1960. In contrast, the number of automobiles jumped eightfold in the decade of the 1950s, reaching over 4 million by 1960.[50] This translates into approximately 80 automobiles per 1,000 inhabitants. In 1960, car ownership per capita was greater in other comparable Western industrial countries, but the rate of increase in new car ownership in the Federal Republic was unsurpassed.[51]

This heightened mobility, including visibly new forms of increased street traffic (and "traffic going nowhere" [*ruhender Verkehr*] alongside the street curbs), reflected increased incomes in the majority of households, but it was also a by-product of the increase in the number of those commuting to work. Statistics underscore this point: In 1960, 27 percent of all workers living in rural communities and only 14 percent of workers in cities had a driver's license.[52] Only one in eight worker's households owned a car, compared with one in four households of civil servants and salaried white-collar workers. However, by 1960, wage earners were responsible for more than half of automobile purchases (in 1950, they had constituted a bare 9 percent, by 1955, a good 28 percent of buyers).[53] We can thus safely assume that the search for a way to get to work that was more comfortable and less dependent on weather conditions sparked the continued boom in automobile ownership in the 1960s.

The automotive industry certainly made it easier to fulfill this wish by offering reasonably priced small cars. The costs of operating an automobile fell as well, both as a result of a drop in gasoline prices in 1958 and new tax policy regulations in 1955 that permitted deduction of commuting expenses. The used-car market also contributed to the increased supply of automobiles, and prices for used cars declined after the middle of the decade. Between 1950 and 1960, the volume of private motorized transport had increased sixfold. During the same period, public transportation increased by only about 60 percent.

Finally, the transportation policies of the federal government, under pressure from the automobile industry, fostered the move to a "society of car owners" with measures that were to the disadvantage of public transportation, especially rail transportation. Costs of short-distance travel with public transportation doubled on average during the same decade in which the costs of private automobile ownership dropped,[54] though further investigation is necessary to establish the phases of this development. What is certain is that car ownership became the means to achieve mobility, not only widening the range of everyday activity for many people, but also helping to open up the world in many different directions, all without leaving the "realm of privacy" (*Privatbereich*). The automobile thus became the symbol of the individual's efforts to construct and extend his or her individual existence, correctly emphasized by F. H. Tenbruck as a central feature of the 1950s.[55]

The "Consumer" Society

By the end of the 1950s, the automobile had become a symbol of societal well-being and affluence; in the memory of many contemporaries, this trend began

49. See *Statistische Jahrbücher für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1952ff.

50. See Verband der Automobilindustrie, ed., *Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrswirtschaft* (Frankfurt, 1954).

51. For a summary and overview, see Jochen Siebke, *Die Automobilnachfrage: Die Nachfrage nach Personenkraftwagen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit einer Prognose bis zum Jahr 1970* (Cologne, 1963), esp. 79ff.

52. See Wolfgang Hartensein and Klaus Liepelt, *Man auf der Straße: Eine verkehrssoziologische Untersuchung* (Frankfurt, 1961), 91f.

53. See *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (1952): 267f.

54. See, for example, Winfried Wolf, *Eisenbahn und Autobahn: Personen- und Gütertransport auf Schiene und Straße, Geschichte, Bilanz, Perspektiven* (Hamburg, 1987), 142ff.

55. Friedrich H. Tenbruck, "Alltagsnormen und Lebensgefühle in der Bundesrepublik," in *Die zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Bilanz*, edited by Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1974), 296f.

in 1948. A common metaphor for describing the move toward an affluent society was the image of a "wave-like motion." A series of waves had washed over West Germans with "better foodstuffs, clothing, housing, automobiles."[56] Helmut Schelsky, writing in the early 1950s, offered one interpretation; the increase in "the universal consumption of industrial . . . mass production" was the most significant factor contributing to "overcoming the class conditions of industrial society" and providing for a "relative levelling of the stratified structure of social relations that once prevailed." This was, according to Schelsky, "perhaps the most dominant development in the present transformation of German society."[57] Like Theodor W. Adorno, Schelsky also felt obliged as early as the mid-1950s to warn of the dangers of "consumption terror" (*"Konsumterror"*),[58] and by the end of the decade, the term *consumption terror* was widely used. According to the interpretative framework put in place by the contemporary "sociology of prosperity"[59] that emerged in the 1950s, West Germans no longer confronted struggles around the distribution of scarce goods. Rather, the most pressing social problem was to make the best use of the multitude of goods and services that were available.

It is essential that we redraw this picture of the origins of the Federal Republic as a "consumer society" in a more differentiated and nuanced fashion: First, we cannot accept the myth of the 1950s—recently revived in the 1980s—of a seamless development from the "winter of hunger" to a "culinary heaven" (*Vom Hungerwinter zum kulinarischen Schlaraffenland*);[60] second, we should interrogate the usefulness of the wave metaphor; and third, we should keep in mind the problematic nature of Schelsky's thesis of the leveling of differences in class status.

To be sure, an unprecedented, rapid increase in prosperity and living standards was the "central experience of the West German population from 1950s

56. Wolfgang Zapf, "Die Wohlfahrtsentwicklung in Deutschland seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Conze and Lepsius, *Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik*, 61.

57. Helmut Schelsky, "Die Bedeutung des Schichtungsbegriffes für die Analyse der gegenwärtigen deutschen Gesellschaft (1953)," in idem, *Auf der Suche nach der Wirklichkeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Düsseldorf, 1965), 332f.

58. See Theodor W. Adorno, *Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1955); and Helmut Schelsky, "Beruf und Freizeit als Erziehungsziele in der modernen Gesellschaft," in idem, *Auf der Suche nach der Wirklichkeit*, 160–81.

59. See Ernest Zahn, *Soziologie der Prosperität: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Zeichen des Wohlstandes* (Cologne, 1960).

60. [*Trans. note: Schlaraffenland* is difficult to capture in English; not the biblical "land of milk and honey," it is a magical land where garden fences are made of sugar, roasted baby pigs wander happily with fork and knife sticking out of their backs waiting to be consumed, sausages hang from trees, and flowers are made of colorful candy.] See Wolfgang Protzner, ed., *Vom Hungerwinter zum kulinarischen Schlaraffenland* (Wiesbaden, 1987); for a more recent regional study of early postwar conditions, Gabriele Stüber, *Der Kampf gegen den Hunger 1945–1950: Die Ernährungslage in der britischen Zone Deutschlands, insbesondere in Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg* (Neumünster, 1984); and Michael Wildt, *Der Traum vom Sattwerden: Hunger und Protest. Schwarzmarkt und Selbsthilfe* (Hamburg, 1986).

on."[61] As early as 1950, real wages were at a level that had been reached previously only in the "top years" of 1913 and 1928; wages continued to grow until the end of the decade at an average annual rate of 5 percent, though with pronounced differences among economic sectors. Thus, wages increased in the agricultural sector by a scant 4 percent, while workers in industry and skilled trades enjoyed wage increases of more than 11 percent.[62] During the years of the "Adenauer era," spanning the 1950s and ending in 1963-64, real wages approximately doubled.

Josef Mooser correctly interprets this development as signaling a "farewell to the 'existence of a proletariat' [*Proletarität*]";[63] West Germans had overcome the norm of a life of poverty and an endless round of worries about the reproduction of labor power and fears of sickness and scarcity in old age. Facilitating this transition were new political initiatives to regulate wages and pensions, including measures to raise benefits for sickness and disability close to normal wage levels. In addition, in 1957 pensions for retired workers were pegged to the increase in the cost of living and wage levels among employed workers.[64] These developments and in particular the "full employment" that continued from 1955 on did not lead to the dissolution of class society nor result in "deproletarianization," as prominent sociologists of the time either noted or predicted. However, improved social security, rising wages, and steady work did make possible a predictable standard of living for members of the lowest income groups at a level that had been achieved only in a few "good" times before the 1950s.

The current conception that West Germans frantically ate, then dressed, then sought housing in a series of "waves" obscures the fact that general conditions of prosperity and social security were achieved only in the last third of the 1950s. The image of waves of consumption washing rapidly over West Germans becomes problematic if we consider sales statistics, broken down by economic sector, for the years immediately following the currency reform.

61. Josef Mooser, *Arbeiterleben in Deutschland 1900–1970: Klassenlagen, Kultur und Politik* (Frankfurt, 1984), 73.

62. For example, Hoffmann, *Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft*, 95.

63. Josef Mooser, "Abschied von der 'Proletarität': Sozialstruktur und Lage der Arbeiterschaft in der Bundesrepublik in historischer Perspektive," in Conze and Lepsius, *Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik*, 143–86.

64. See the fundamental work of Hans Günther Hockerts, *Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland: Alliierte und deutsche Sozialversicherungspolitik 1945–1957* (Stuttgart, 1980).

Shortly after currency reform, retail sales of clothing, linens, and especially house and apartment furnishings increased more rapidly than did sales of foodstuffs and luxury items. The privation and general lack of essential commodities in the immediate postwar period and the start of new housing construction by the late 1940s combined to establish the priorities mirrored in these statistics.[65] Moreover, the consumption and expenditure statistics for working-class households indicate that workers typically reduced what they ate in order to scrimp and save for other things. It was not until 1958 that the consumption of meat, a traditional indicator of the standard of living, reached the level of 1935–38.[66]

At the same time, the savings rate of private households grew from a comparably high 3.1 percent in 1950 to an unprecedented level of 8.7 percent ten years later.[67] According to a representative survey conducted at the end of the 1950s, more than 80 percent of housewives and heads-of-households indicated they believed thriftiness was an essential part of "good character"; 69 percent of those housewives questioned in the survey responded that they would rather wait two hours for the next bus than take a taxi. According to the poll, only 21 percent of households had made purchases on credit, and more than two-thirds had no debt.[68] Thriftiness in one's private life seems to have been a part of the "striving for security" that was an understandable goal in the early 1950s. Money was saved primarily for such durable consumer items as cars and homes; memories that focus on outfitting the home with the latest technological innovations do not accurately capture the reality of most people's lives. According to surveys conducted in April 1958, only 11 percent of working-class and 28 percent of white-collar households had a refrigerator, the accepted symbol of the "economic miracle"; electric washing machines were present in only 20 percent of working-class and 26 percent of white-collar households.[69]

The current debate over the history of women's emancipation has largely neglected the fact that the material improvement in the standard of living at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, especially for the lower classes, was to a considerable extent attributable to married women's work outside the home. Although in public opinion surveys, men still insisted that

65. See *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952*, 230ff.

66. See Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch über Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten der Bundesrepublik 1959* (Hamburg, 1960), 141f.

67. See Klaus Hesse, *Das diskretionäre Einkommen, seine Bestimmung und Verwendung* (Berlin, 1974), 26; and Reinhold Exo, *Die Entwicklung der sozialen und ökonomischen Struktur der Ersparnisbildung* (Berlin, 1967).

68. See, for example, Günther Schmölders, *Der Umgang mit Geld im privaten Haushalt* (Berlin, 1969), 61.

69. See DIVO Institut, ed., *Der westdeutsche Markt in Zahlen: Ein Handbuch für Forschung, Werbung und Verkauf* (Frankfurt, 1958).

women should take on wage employment only in emergency situations,[70] estimates reveal that in the early 1960s, only two-thirds of working-class families could maintain their standard of living from the husband's earnings alone in "complete families" (*Vollfamilien*).[71] Between 1957 and 1966, the number of wives of working-class men who worked climbed from one in four to one in three; the proportion was lower among white-collar workers. Working-class wives worked mainly at unskilled or semiskilled positions; their main motivation in working outside the home was to increase the income of the household.[72] Only with the income earned by working-class wives and with the assistance of men's overtime and supplementary income from other jobs was it possible for working-class families to satisfy their desire to participate in the growing prosperity.

These developments reflected a deliberate economic policy, summarized in 1953 by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard: The "luxuries of today" could "only become the general consumer goods of tomorrow . . . , if we accept that in an initial phase, they will only be available to a small group with elevated incomes who will have the purchasing power to obtain these goods."[73] The agencies that designed and administered economic policy sought not to achieve social and economic equality in the distribution of goods, but rather to create an "elevator" (U. Beck) effect that would lift the entire society. A good example of this tendency is offered by the wage agreements reached in most cases quickly and without labor conflict, once IG Metall (the metalworkers' union) had pointed the way by winning its fight to narrow the gap between the status of wage workers and white-collar salaried employees in 1956.[74] Only at the close of the 1960s did accumulation of capital and the ongoing concentration of wealth, welcome developments in the 1950s, again become a controversial political issue.

Just how little the increase in prosperity *directly* brought about a leveling of differences in social class becomes apparent if we consider the distribution

70. See particularly the extensive empirical data in Elisabeth Pfeil, *Die Berufstätigkeit von Müttern* (Tübingen, 1961); an interpretive view of contemporary social research on this theme is provided in Ingrid N. Sommerkorn's "Die erwerbstätige Mutter in der Bundesrepublik: Einstellungs- und Problemänderungen," in *Wandel und Kontinuität der Familie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Rosemarie Nave-Herz (Stuttgart, 1988), 115–44.

71. See for example, Osterland et al., *Industriearbiter in der BRD*, 132.

72. See Karl Schwarz, "Umfang der Frauenerwerbstätigkeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Erwerbsbeteiligung und Arbeitszeiten," *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft* 11 (1985): 241–60.

73. Ludwig Erhard, "Einen Kühlschrank in jeden Haushalt," in *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik: Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, idem (Düsseldorf, 1962), 221.

74. See most recently Irene Dittrich and Wilfried Kalk, "'Wir wollen nicht länger Menschen zweiter Klasse sein!' Der Metallarbeiterstreik in Schleswig-Holstein 1956/57," in *Demokratische Geschichte: Jahrbuch zur Arbeiterbewegung und Demokratie in Schleswig-Holstein*, vol. 2 (Kiel, 1987), 351–93.

of the "cultural capital" (Pierre Bordieu), acquired primarily through socialization in families and educational institutions. Consider some of the general characteristics of the West German educational system. After a number of experiments in West Germany at the beginning of the 1950s, there was a return to a tradition of a rigidly organized system of schools, offering a general education; throughout the 1950s the scheme for distributing students to individual schools was no different from that which had prevailed at the beginning of the century. In 1951, 80 percent of all students in grade five or higher were in *Volksschulen*; the figure was the same in 1926–27, and by 1960 it had declined by only 10 percent. The proportion of students at *Gymnasien* increased in the 1950s, from about 10 percent to 15 percent.[75] The distribution of students is reflected by the relative number of students who completed various sorts of degree certificates: 4.4 percent of those who left school in 1958 did so after finishing the advanced *Abitur*; 13.3 percent had completed the "middle" (*Mittlerereife*) or "professional school" (*Fachschulreife*) certificate.[76] Examining the social origins of students, the sociologist Morris Janowitz observed that although the top and bottom parts of the lowest social class constituted more than half the population, these groups accounted for only 5 percent of university students.[77] In the 1960s, these circumstances provoked the movement to develop West Germany's untapped educational potential.

The results of public opinion polling make clear that the mobilization of the 1960s against the skewed distribution of educational opportunities was essential; until the beginning of that decade, the vast majority of the population completely accepted the status quo.[78] When asked in 1961 whether a good education was available to everyone or whether it was dependent upon the wealth

75. Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft*, 127f.; Helmut Köhler, *Der relative Schul- und Hochschulbesuch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952 bis 1975: Ein Indikator für die Entwicklung des Bildungswesens* (Berlin, 1978), 169. [*Trans. note*: In the 1950s, all school-age children attended the *Volksschule* for primary school, grades 1–4. Depending on the results of tests administered at the end of the fourth year, students either continued in the *Volksschule*, finishing their schooling with an examination at the end of the eighth grade, often moving immediately into an apprenticeship or another form of vocational training, or they entered the *Oberschule* (secondary school), which consisted of the *Gymnasium*. If a student completed six years of schooling after the *Volksschule*, he or she obtained the *Mittlerereife* ("middle certificate") and left school upon completion of grade 10. Elite students completed eight years of advanced instruction and achieved the prestigious *Abitur*, a comprehensive school-leaving examination, after completing grade 12. The *Abitur* was a prerequisite for university studies. Today this picture is more complex as a result of school reforms; various *Oberschulen* exist, and it is possible to attend the university without having received an *Abitur* from the *Gymnasium*.]

76. See Heiner Meulemann, "Bildungsexpansion und Wandel der Bildungsvorstellungen zwischen 1958 und 1979: Eine Kohortenanalyse," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 11 (1982): 227–53.

77. Morris Janowitz, "Soziale Schichtung und Mobilität in Westdeutschland," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 10 (1958): 1–38.

78. See Janpeter Kob, *Erziehung im Elternhaus und Schule* (Stuttgart, 1963), 53.

and social status of the student's father, only slightly more than half of the sample of youth questioned responded that socioeconomic circumstances determined an individual's educational opportunities.[79] It is important to keep in mind that youth in the 1950s were far more profoundly shaped by work and occupational experience than youth today. In 1953, almost 70 percent of all seventeen-year-olds and 85 percent of all eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were already members of the workforce; the figures for 1984 are 19 percent and 56 percent, respectively.[80]

For many students formal schooling did not end with wage work, but we know little about the function and significance of vocational schools—along with on-the-job training, part of the "dual system" of apprenticeship training—that had been standard in Germany since the 1920s. In 1949, mandatory vocational education was introduced throughout Germany; eleven years later, two-thirds of all boys but only two-fifths of girls who were required to attend did in fact participate in vocational training. One reason for this low rate was the inadequate supply of school training programs. By 1952, all male youth who were required by law to attend vocational school were enrolled, but 20 percent of girls were "held back" or excused from attending because there were still not enough vocational schools to accommodate them.[81]

To be sure, the long-term trend toward more highly qualified vocational training continued. Of those *Volksschule* students born between 1887 and 1896, 60 percent did not complete an apprenticeship upon leaving school; for those born between 1927 and 1936, this figure was 37 percent; and for those born between 1937 and 1946, who finished school in the 1950s, the figure dropped to 24 percent.[82] Despite these undeniable improvements, the pace of change in education and training in the Federal Republic lagged behind the rapid rates of economic progress and structural change, measured both in absolute terms and relative to other national experiences. The discussion in the 1960s of the "German educational disaster" (Picht) underscored this situation.

If we consider all the characteristics of the development of a "consumer society" that we have discussed here, then on balance, for the second half of the decade it would still be more appropriate to speak of a "society of work," not a "society of consumption."

79. See Peter Kmieciak, *Wertstrukturen und Wertwandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Grundlagen einer interdisziplinären empirischen Wertforschung mit einer Sekundäranalyse von Umfragedaten* (Göttingen, 1977), Table III, 10a.

80. See Jürgen Zinnecker, *Jugendkultur 1940–1985* (Opladen, 1987), 313.

81. See "Die berufsbildenden Schulen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahr 1952," *Wirtschaft und Statistik* 6 (1954):188–90.

82. See Horst Steiger and Heinrich Tegtmeyer, "Sozialstruktur im Wandel," in *Soziale Strukturen und individuelle Mobilität: Beiträge zur soziodemographischen Analyse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Heinrich Tegtmeyer (Wiesbaden, 1979), 104; see also the study by Wolfgang Lengsfeld, "Vergleich der Schulausbildung von Kindern mit der ihrer Eltern," in ibid.

The "Leisure" Society

If the image of West Germany in the 1950s as a "consumer society" should be interrogated, then the concept of the 1950s as a "leisure society" deserves even greater scrutiny. The characterization of the 1950s as an age of "leisure" had already assumed mythical status in the analyses of contemporaries; it had also triggered a wealth of sociological, anthropological, and pedagogical interpretations that saw "leisure" as a "problem."[83] Behind these critical reflections was the thesis that fashion and the media "externally managed" the consumer and that consumers expressed themselves most fully in the realm of leisure activities. However, for most West Germans in the 1950s, there were no indications that there was a rapid increase in available leisure time.

By the mid-1950s, the actual workweek in industry had again reached forty-nine hours, the level of the 1930s.[84] Contrary to popular opinion, when the five-day workweek became the norm for many sectors in 1956-57,[85] leisure time did not dramatically increase, because on those five days, workers were expected to put in longer hours. Thus, between 1957 and 1960, the workday for those employed in industry declined by only 0.9 hours.[86] The thesis of a rapid increase of leisure time is even less convincing if we consider that the hours of industrial workers in large firms, well-documented since 1957, were the shortest work hours of any workers;[87] in smaller firms, workers put in many hours of overtime that were not recorded in the statistics. In addition, there are definitional problems. From 1957 on, we can document the tendency of many workers to take on a "second job" (*Zweitjob*); in 1961, this was how 7 percent of all wage earners used their "leisure time."[88] We also need to consider the significance of "work after quitting time" (*Feierabendarbeit*), which was done by workers to pursue individual goals, for example, by working on a small agricultural holding or by participating in the common practice of mutual cooperation with neighbors in the building of private residences. Finally, we must also consider the time spent commuting to the workplace, an area that has received inadequate attention. In addition, the increasing employment of housewives and automobile ownership altered established routines of everyday life. Rather than organizing consumption to meet household needs with daily purchases over the course of the workweek, these chores were increasingly done on Saturday, making it difficult to see this day as "leisure time." Admittedly, "long weekends" did offer opportunities to maintain ties to family members and others; there was, however, little time for such forms of sociability during the week.

Responses to rather imprecise annual public opinion surveys confirm the impression that there was little increase in leisure time in the 1950s; between 1957 and 1960, these surveys indicated a daily increase in "leisure" of only eleven minutes. This brought the total up to scarcely three hours a day; today, the figure is four-and-one-half hours daily.[89] In general, the available evidence adds up to a picture of a population that was extremely industrious and hardworking. A survey conducted in Baden-Württemburg in the mid-1950s doubtless described other regions as well; it revealed that 80 percent of the population was in bed at 10:30 at night and up again before 7:00 the next morning.[90] According to a survey conducted in 1955, about 40 percent of West Germans felt stressed and overworked, and these sentiments were even more pronounced among white-collar salaried employees, civil servants, and the self-employed than among the working class.[91]

For the years before 1960, we know little about how people used their leisure time.[92] On the one hand, contemporary accounts from the first half of the 1950s revealed pronounced trends toward "domesticity," which would be in keeping with the straitened household budgets of new homeowners. On the other hand, contemporary observers also noted a strong "pull from outside"

83. For extensive references to the contemporary literature, see Erich Weber, *Das Freizeitproblem: Anthropologisch-pädagogische Untersuchung* (Munich, 1963); and for a critical analysis, especially Kurt Hammerich, *Kritische Studien zur Freizeitpädagogik und Freizeitsoziologie*, 2d ed. (Kastellaun, 1978).

84. See, for example, Eike Ballerstedt, *Soziologischer Almanach* (Frankfurt, 1975), 264f.

85. See Karl-Heinz Kevelaer and Karl Hinrichs, "Arbeitszeit und 'Wirtschaftswunder': Rahmenbedingungen des Übergangs zur 40-Stunden Woche in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Politische Vierteljahrsschrift* 25 (1985): 52–75; and Michael Schneider, *Streit um Arbeitszeit: Geschichte des Kampfes um Arbeitszeitverkürzung in Deutschland* (Cologne, 1984), 152ff.

86. See Osterland et al., *Industriearbiter in der BRD*, table 60; work hours "rendered" [*"geleistete" Arbeitsstunden*]—a statistical measurement first recorded in 1957—refers to hours spent at one's workplace less industry-mandated break periods.

87. For data on the mid-1960s, see the figures provided by the Statistisches Bundesamt in Jürgen Dern, "Die Ausgaben für Freizeitgüter von Selbständigen- und Arbeitnehmerhaushalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Die Familienhaushalte im wirschaftlichen und sozialen Wandel: Rationalverhalten, Technisierung, Funktionswandel der Privathaushalte und das Freizeitbudget der Frau*, edited by Rosemarie Schweitzer and Helga Pross (Göttingen, 1977), 291–318 (here, 294).

88. See Hermann Funke, "Freizeit in der Stadt," in *Freizeit*, edited by Reinhard Schmitz-Scherzer (Frankfurt, 1973), 187.

89. See Pavel Uttiz, "Gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen für die Entwicklung des Freizeitverhaltens von 1953 bis 1980 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung*, edited by University of Cologne, ZA-Information 15/1984, 31; it is important to remember that the concept of what exactly constituted "leisure-time activities" changed over time.

90. See Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, ed., *Süddeutscher Rundfunk: Die Rundfunkhörer 1953/54* (Allensbach, 1954), 18.

91. *Die soziale Wirklichkeit: Aus einer Untersuchung des Instituts für Demoskopie. Mit einem Vorwort von Otto Lenz*, (Allensbach, 1956), 25.

92. Especially worthy of mention is Erich Reigrotzki, *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik: Elemente der sozialen Teilnahme in Kirche, Politik, Organisationen und Freizeit* (Tübingen, 1956).

(*Sog von draußen*);[93] the twofold increase in visits to the movies between 1950 and 1960 to about 800 million is but one indication of this.[94] We have more precise data on the leisure activity of youth, because it was investigated far more thoroughly.[95] One important conclusion of this research is that young people differed little from the older generation in how they used their leisure time, hardly surprising given the large percentage of young people already in the labor force.

In the early 1950s, radio had already exerted an influence on patterns of everyday life—such as meal times—and by the last third of the decade, television began to play a greater role in structuring leisure time.[96] Contemporary observers who emphasized the significance of leisure and consumption also called attention to the ways in which society was increasingly dominated by the media[97] and increasingly informal in nature.[98] In the early 1950s, the number of radio stations already surpassed prewar levels, and it continued to increase until the end of the decade. The introduction of an ultra-shortwave network (UKW-Netze) represented a trend toward "modernization"; by the mid-1950s, 40-45 percent of all households—about half of the radio audience—listened to the new frequencies.[99] This development reflected two types of "modernization": first, the expanded number of radio stations represented a technological innovation; second, a greater number of stations made possible a greater variety in program offerings, targeted at specific regional audiences, in contrast to the single alternative, broadcast to the entire nation, that had previously been available.

Despite these innovations, the preferences and attitudes of radio listeners diverged little from the traditions of the 1930s. Survey data indicate that radio was seen as a form of entertainment, a distraction from other concerns. Traditions established in the 1930s were also reflected in the structure of programming, which divided broadcasts evenly between talk shows and musical programs.[100]

93. See Margarethe Rudorff, "Die Schrumpfung des Begriffes 'Wohnung' und ihre Folgerungen," *Soziale Welt* 6 (1955): 47.

94. See the detailed statistical material in Hermann Busch, "Der Absatz in der Filmwirtschaft unter dem Einfluß des Fernsehens" (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche diss., University of Mannheim, 1962).

95. For an assessment of the contemporary empirical social research data, in addition to Zinnecker, see Helmut Fend, *Sozialgeschichte des Aufwachsens: Lebensbedingungen, Erziehungsverhältnisse und Jugendgestalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1987).

96. See the various surveys of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach on behalf of *Süddeutscher Rundfunk*.

97. See Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* (Munich, 1956), a book that attracted considerable attention when it was published.

98. See, for example, Helmut Schelsky, *Soziologie der Sexualität* (Reinbek, 1955), 51ff.

99. For figures on the regional service of the Hessischer Rundfunk, see Sepp Groth, *Strukturen und Stimmen der Rundfunkhörer in Hessen: Forschungsbericht über die Ereignisse einer Feldstudie im Oktober 1956 mit den dazu grundlegenden soziographischen Bestandsaufnahmen* (Frankfurt, n.d.), 100. This was a survey conducted by the Soziographisches Institut of the Johann-Wolfgang Goethe University.

For most West Germans, the "television age" only began at the end of the 1950s. In 1957, one million television sets were in place to receive the ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands, or Working Group of German Radio Broadcasters) program that started broadcasting on November 1, 1954; by 1960 this number had increased to almost four million. In terms of social class, the ownership of television sets was distributed roughly equally across all social groups, but it was by no means evenly distributed across all regions. In 1960, 14 of every 100 Bavarian households owned a television set, whereas the figure for North Rhine Westphalia was 30 in every 100,[101] though in terms of social class, the owners of television sets were distributed roughly equally across all social groups. The earliest data on television audiences[102] revealed that in 90 percent of the households with televisions, viewers turned on their sets every day and typically watched TV for about eighty minutes daily; they spent significantly more time watching television on the weekends. Declining numbers in restaurants, dance halls, and movie theaters, on the one hand, and no decrease in the readership for illustrated magazines, on the other, were additional indications of the tendency toward spending more time at home. This trend toward domesticity was more pronounced among workers and the residents of smaller towns and villages than among white-collar workers and residents of large cities. A 1958 survey investigated the motivations for purchase of a television set:[103] (1) 29 percent enjoyed television as a source of entertainment and distraction; (2) 21 percent reported that television allowed them to stay at home, it kept the family together, and it contributed to a cozy atmosphere in the household; (3) and 16 percent had purchased a television as a source of information.

There were strong similarities in the programming desires of television viewers and radio listeners. For example, we can point to the early success of the television family "Schölermann," "our neighbor this evening,"[104] a format that influenced the style and content of other programs. Those responsible for television programming quickly understood that the public "demanded" "technically perfect, well-made" wholesome, family-oriented shows, as Clemens Münster, head of television programming for the Bavarian Broadcast

100. For a detailed survey of radio programming in the Weimar years, see Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, Historisches Archiv der ARD, ed., *Projektgruppe Programmgeschichte: Zur Programmgeschichte des Weimarer Rundfunks* (Frankfurt, 1986).

101. See H.-A. Zieling, "Der Ton- und Fernsehrundfunk in Niedersachsen," *Statistische Monatshefte für Niedersachsen* (1961): 393f.

102. *Der Fernsehzuschauer 1954/55: Ein Jahresbericht. NWDR. Hörerforschung* (Hamburg, n.d. [1955]).

103. See Josef Bennemann, "Verbrauch und Verbrauchswandlungen" (Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Diss., Erlangen/Nuremburg, 1962).

104. See NWDR, ed., *Die Ansage*, no. 214 (February 2, 1955).

Corporation, observed.[105] Although some middle-class viewers hoped that television might offer something of greater educational value, they received no more consideration than the radio listeners who had expressed similar desires in the 1930s.

At the same time that West German society accepted the television and related forms of a "new domesticity," citizens of the Federal Republic began, particularly in the summer months, to participate in the phenomenon of mass tourism, another characteristic of the "leisure society." To be sure, the only definitive study of tourism in the late 1950s correctly identified tourism as a form of luxury for consumers (*Luxuskonsum*).[106] However, by this point approximately one West German in three had consumed this luxury. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a vacation trip had become an obtainable goal.[107] There is no question that travel, particularly with one's own automobile, contributed to a feeling of "modernity"; particularly for vacationers, though their numbers were still limited, travel was a form of private mobility that allowed for a brief illusion of release from social constraints. However, a large portion of the 20 percent of vacationers who traveled abroad remained in German-speaking areas.

A Balance Sheet

Erich Kästner once ironically characterized the mix of traditional values with West Germans' willingness to accept certain aspects of modernity as a "motorized Biedermeier" [the paradoxical image of a German driving his new automobile, still holding on to the conservative values, tastes, and attitudes of the nineteenth century]. Kästner's image evokes several associations, invites further exploration,[108] and, in particular, points to the need for a more detailed consideration of political culture. In the early 1950s, there were marked continuities in political norms and patterns of political behavior.[109]

For most West Germans, political socialization had taken place under authoritarian forms of rule, and their experience was limited to authoritarian

105. Clemens Münster at the Third Television Conference of the Protestant Church, "Tagungsbericht Nr. 16," in *Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv* (dra), ARD 0-73.

106. See Hans-Jürgen Knebel, *Soziologische Strukturwandlungen im modernen Tourismus* (Stuttgart, 1960), 4; and Han Magnus Enzensberger's critical essay, "Eine Theorie des Tourismus," in *Einzelheiten*, idem, vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1962), 147–68, an essay that attracted much attention at the time of its publication.

107. For an overview of empirical surveys since the end of the 1950s, see Erwin K. Scheuch, "Soziologie der Freizeit," in *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung*, vol. 11, 2d ed., edited by Rene König (Stuttgart, 1977), 123ff.

108. For a contemporary attempt, see Norbert Muhlen, "Das Land der großen Mitte: Notizen aus dem Neo-Biedermeier," *Der Monat* 6 (1953): 237–44.

109. See Jürgen Falter, "Kontinuität und Neubeginn: Die Bundestagswahl 1949 zwischen Weimar und Bonn," *Politische Vierteljahrsschrift* 22 (1981): 241.

forms of politics (for example, the structures within which political parties developed their programs); West Germans had been shaped by the *Kaiserreich*,[110] the presidential regimes at the end of the Weimar Republic (1930-33), the National Socialist dictatorship,[111] and the rule of the Allied forces of occupation. In comparison, the legacy of the few years of a functioning democracy in the Weimar Republic was far less significant. For this reason, it is not surprising that when West Germans were asked in 1952, "In general—are you interested in politics?" only 27 percent responded in the affirmative. By 1959, the number of those answering "yes" had increased by only 2 percent.[112] In the early 1950s, public opinion surveys still recorded strong sympathies for the monarchy and authoritarian forms of government. Only a decade later did a majority of the population offer a positive assessment of the existing political system.[113]

Public opinion surveys recorded a "monotonously unequivocal orientation toward the west"[114] in the 1950s, but this tendency should not be exaggerated; it reflected less a rejection of a chauvinistic German *Sonderweg* (peculiar path) and an endorsement of the "modern west" than an alignment with the West in the global struggle of the Cold War. Perhaps the most striking example of how divergent political attitudes could be brought together by the pressure of the international context was the rebuilding of the West German army with soldiers who had begun their careers in the battle against the "Bolshevik East" and who in certain respects thus needed no reeducation.

It is difficult to disentangle the means by which various strands of political culture asserted themselves, collided, and coalesced in the 1950s. For the first part of the decade, unmistakably conservative sentiments were dominant. Social Democrats and conservatives were unified in their anticommunism, but a conservative rhetoric of a "Christian West" (*christliches Abendland*) not only helped establish the Federal Republic as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, it also hindered the development of liberal, democratic attitudes.[115] For the

110. On the political elite, see Frank R. Pfetsch, "Die Gründergeneration der Bundesrepublik: Sozialprofil und politische Orientierung," *Politische Vierteljahrsschrift* 27 (1986): 237–51.

111. See, for example, Heinz Bude, *Deutsche Karrieren: Lebenskonstruktionen sozialer Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfergeneration* (Frankfurt, 1987); and Gabriele Rosenthal, *"Wenn alles in Scherben fällt": Von Leben und Sinnwelt der Kriegsgeneration* (Opladen, 1987).

112. See, for example, Hans Braun, "Das Streben nach 'Sicherheit' in den 50er Jahren: Soziale und politische Ursachen und Erscheinungsweisen," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 18 (1978): 290ff.

113. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Der Staatsbürger und sein Staat," *Zwanzig jahre danach: Eine deutsche Bilanz 1945–1965*, edited by Helmut Hammerschmidt (Munich, 1965), 82.

114. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Die Westdeutschen, die westliche Demokratie und die Westbindung im Licht von Meinungsumfragen," in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Beziehungen im Wandel*, edited by James A. Cooney et al. (Stuttgart, 1985), 101.

115. See Harold Hurwitz, "Antikommunismus und amerikanische Demokratisierungsvorhaben im Nachkriegsdeutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 29/78, 29–46.

postwar years, Jürgen Habermas identified a general tendency to "combine positive attitudes toward social modernity with a negative assessment of cultural modernity,"[116] though he failed to specify the characteristics of "cultural modernity."

The positive assessment of "social modernity" in contemporary commentaries reflected the belief that liberal principles—such as individual achievement, individual freedom, or equality before the law—could be combined with traditional values of the family and conceptions of morality grounded in religion. A measure of West Germans' acceptance of "social modernity," aptly described by Hans Maier, was the prevailing tendency in the Federal Republic to evaluate technological innovation and change in objective terms; technological change was robbed of its demonic and dramatic quality.[117] From the mid-1950s on, the increasing acceptance of a "pluralistic society" by Catholic intellectuals[118] and the pragmatic move of the Social Democratic "camp" to distance itself from the Marxist-inspired "socialist idea"[119] reflected the same tendency to evaluate technological and social change in objective, nonideological terms. Dire, pessimistic warnings of the "dangers of technology" that could be conjured up after the experience of Hiroshima and the war were quickly pushed aside by positive prognoses for the future, embodied in particular in the optimistic assessment of the "second industrial revolution."[120]

Writing in the late 1950s, Ralf Dahrendorf concluded that after the war, West Germans had experienced a "change in values," moving away from a "heroic past and an emphasis on community and hard work" to an emphasis on "guiding principles of behavior [that stressed] individual success and the pleasures of life."[121] Dahrendorf's assessment was not entirely accurate. Perhaps he could identify hedonistic tendencies among young people who were just coming of age. However, satisfaction in work and "success in life" should not be so readily seen as mutually exclusive alternatives. A more adequate description would focus on the tendency for all attitudes to be structured increasingly

116. Jürgen Habermas, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen* (Frankfurt, 1985), 90; see also Richard Saage, *Rückkehr zum starken Staat? Studien über Konservatismus, Faschismus und Demokratie* (Frankfurt, 1983).

117. Hans Maier, *Die Deutschen und die Freiheit: Perspketiven der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, 1985); and very similar in this context, Günther Gaus, *Die Welt der Westdeutschen: Kritische Betrachtungen* (Cologne, 1986), 80.

118. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft heute*, vol. 3 (Freiburg, 1960), 3.

119. Wolfgang Abendroth, "Bilanz der sozialistischen Idee in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Bestandsaufnahme: Eine deutsche Bilanz 1962*, edited by Hans Werner Richter (Munich, 1962), 233–63.

120. Leo Brandt, *Die zweite industrielle Revolution* (Munich, 1957).

121. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Die neue Gesellschaft: Soziale Strukturwandlungen der Nachkriegszeit," in Richter, *Bestandsaufnahme*, 215.

by economic values; from this perspective, we can understand the obsession with consumption, characteristic of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, deplored by contemporaries as an expression of "western materialism."[122]

"Americanization" was another shorthand for describing the changes in West German society in the 1950s. On the one hand, this label pointed to characteristics of a functioning civil society and conscious resistance against state intervention into the private sphere. On the other, "Americanization" functioned as a negative symbol of lost norms and traditions that had created a sense of community. From both perspectives, "America" was a "sociological barometer," the mirror of one's own "modern" future.[123] The data on attitudes toward "America" are muddled, and assessments of "America" are confusing and inconsistent. In general, positive attitudes toward "Americans" intensified in the late 1950s.[124] But in the first half of the decade, the prevailing view was that even if there was much to be learned from Americans about technological innovation, Americans could teach Germans nothing about culture.[125] Despite significant efforts by the United States, for example, in "Amerikahäuser" and in programs to advance cultural exchanges, this prejudice against American culture only intensified in the early 1950s. U.S. public opinion surveys revealed that 70 percent of the German population subscribed to this prejudice in 1956, up from 58 percent in 1950.[126] We still do not have adequate documentation of whether young West Germans came to have more positive attitudes toward "Americans" because of the influence of American music and youth culture.

Ultimately internal developments are more central than external factors for explaining the modernization of West Germany in the 1950s. Trends toward modernization, initiated and advanced in the 1950s, became dramatically apparent in the arena of political culture at the end of the 1960s. By then, there was no question that the Federal Republic was a "modern western"

122. See Klaus Mehnert, "Die weltpolitische Situation," *Wo stehen wir heute?*, edited by H. Walter Bähr (Gütersloh, 1960), 121–30.

123. See Fritz Sternberg, "Die Deutschen in der Weltgeschichte: Soziologische Bermerkungen," in Richter, *Bestandsaufnahme*, 71; this also explains the broad interest in the work of the American sociologist David Riesman in the 1950s and 1960s. See, for example, David Riesman, *Die einsame Masse: Eine Untersuchung der Wandlungen des amerikanischen Charakters. Mit einer Einführung in die deutsche Ausgabe von Helmut Schelsky* (Reinbek, 1958).

124. In response to the question posed by the Allensbach Institute: "Do you like the Americans or do you not particularly like them?", in 1957, 37 percent responded with "like them"; in 1961, the figure was 51 percent. See Andreas Kirschhofer, "Die Deutschen über sich selbst: Meinungsumfragen sind in Bewegung geraten. Eine demoskopische Standortsbestimmung," *Moderne Welt* (1967): 188.

125. See Heinz Hartmann, *Amerikanische Firmen in Deutschland: Beobachtungen über Kontakte und Kontraste zwischen Industriegesellschaften* (Cologne, 1963), 71.

126. See Heinz H. Fischer, "Das Amerikabild in der deutschen Bevölkerung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg: Eine Untersuchung auf der Basis der OMGUS- und HICOG-Berichte," *ZA Information*, No. 17/1985, 51–60; No. 18/1986, 57–66.

society, although in the context of the relaxation of tensions between east and west, it was also apparent that it was entirely possible to revitalize nationalistic sentiments. The 1950s were characterized by economic growth, technological modernization, changes in patterns of consumption and lifestyles, and even signs of "changes in values." However, unlike the experience of the Weimar Republic, where challenges were met with extreme responses that resulted in failure, the dramatic changes of the 1950s combined to create a climate of stability, capable of withstanding the socioeconomic, political, and cultural convulsions of the 1960s. Perhaps after the experiences of "total war" and "years of starvation," Germans needed to appear modest and outwardly rigid and strict in order to redefine traditional virtues and norms in accord with the demands of a new age.

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