First published in 2001 by
Berg
Editorial offices:
150 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JJ, UK
838 Broadway, Third Floor, New York, NY 10003-4812, USA

Berg is the imprint of Oxford International Publishers Ltd.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 1 85973 511 8 (Cloth)

Typeset by JS Typesetting, Wellingborough, Northants.
Printed in the United Kingdom by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire.

Contents

German Historical Perspective Series
General Editors:
Gerhard A. Ritter and Anthony J. Nicholls

Volume I
Population, Labour and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany
Edited by Klaus J. Bade

Volume II
Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe: The History and Sociology of Public Finance
Edited by Peter-Christian Witt

Volume III
Nation-Building in Central Europe
Edited Hagen Schultze

Volume IV
Elections, Parties and Political Traditions: Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems
Edited by Karl Rohe

Volume V
Economic Crisis and Political Collapse: The Weimar Republic, 1924–1933
Edited by Jürgen Baron von Kruedener

Volume VI
Escape into War: The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany
Edited by Gregor Schöllgen

Volume VII
German Unification: The Unexpected Challenge
Edited by Dieter Grosser

Volume VIII
Germany's New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives
Edited by Arnulf Baring

Volume IX
Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration 1945–1960
Edited by Clemens Wurm

Volume X
The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the Twentieth Century
Edited by Klaus-Jürgen Müller

Volume XI
Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1995
Edited by Reiner Pommerin

Volume XII
The Problem of Revolution in Germany, 1789–1989
Edited by Reinhard Rürup

Volume XIII
Science in the Third Reich
Edited by Margit Szöllösi-Janze

Volume XIV
The Third Reich Between Vision and Reality
Edited by Hans Mommsen

German Historical Perspectives/XV

The Divided Past
Rewriting Post-War German History

Edited by
CHRISTOPH KLESSMANN

Oxford • New York

THOMAS LINDENBERGER

Everyday History: New Approaches to the History of the Post-War Germanies

The rewriting of history has always been one of the major preoccupations of historians, if they wanted to keep in touch with their contemporaries. This is particularly true for contemporary history. *Zeitgeschichte* (defined by Hans Rothfels as the epoch of the historian's contemporaries) often consists of rereading and reinterpretating well-known facts and evidence, driven by the course of history itself. In the case of the German present, it is not only because of the sudden opening of archives and the more or less unrestricted access to the secrets of the GDR state machinery that we are looking out for new concepts and narratives. Above all, it is a society perceiving its own recent past from new angles and in a new light, now asking for new answers to new questions, which motivates the exercise of rewriting. Of course this questioning and debating is in itself as pluralistic and polyphonous as it can be in an open society such as unified Germany. And it is a process open to change in itself: there are dominant and subdominant voices; for some time, certain themes and motives prevail over all others, opinions which have been muted in the beginning may come to the fore, and so on.

In the last ten years, it was above all the GDR past which preoccupied the history-minded public, alongside new waves of 'coming-to-terms with the Nazi past' already characteristic for the West German public before 1989. West Germany's past, by contrast, could not mobilise emotions and controversies in a similar way. On the contrary, its seemingly untainted success served as an unquestioned model and yardstick with which to evaluate the East German past: in terms of economic productivity, the efficiency of its infrastructure,

the modernity of mentalities and civic culture, including the unfolding pluralism and creative diversity of the post-1968 decades – it went without saying that old West Germany was the past future, which East Germany had missed out on and which it now had to catch up with, with the not wholly unselfish assistance of West Germans 'experts'.

In recent months and years, however, this state of self-complacency in the (predominantly West) German public is beginning to give way to a somewhat less one-sided distribution of good and evil, of successes and failures. Historisation has taken possession of new objects. I briefly mention only two apparently 'superficial' manifestations of this very recent process: (1) the 'CDU-Spendenaffäre', the funding scandal of the Christian Democratic Party, has thrown up questions about the very nature of party politics – in particular during the period which by now has become identified as the *Kohl-Ära*. Some critics even coined the notion of a 'Kohl-Regime' or 'System Kohl',[1] thus marking a sudden and thorough demystification of the miraculous politics leading to German unification. (2) Another example is the 'IT-panic', by which I refer to the realization of Germany's lagging behind in modern information technologies owing to missed opportunities in modernizing the education system and the system of labour relations. I don't want to go in further details on such current debates, I just mention them as symptomatic of the beginning of a self-critical re-evalution of the past record of West Germany. And I think that they actually provide good opportunities to discuss problems and chances of a critical rewriting of West Germany's history prior to 1989.

I shall return to this changing frame of reference of historical perception in the German public at the end of my essay. I allude to it because I think that *Zeitgeschichte*, contemporary history, among all historical sub-disciplines is, whether scholars like it or not, the most susceptible to such changes, and therefore in a certain way also the most vulnerable to being dependent on shifting moods and sentiments among the political public. Society's way to apprehend and structure the space of its own recent past affects the historian's work in several ways: in his quality as a scholar, but also as a citizen sharing experiences and mind-settings of his time. Therefore, reflections on rewriting the post-war German histories require a certain sense of place as to the historical moment in which it is situated.

I shall try to contribute to this effort of reflection by discussing the potential of *Alltagsgeschichte*, the history of everyday life, as one historiographical approach among others that could and should

inform future contemporary history. I shall start by looking back on the beginning of the last major wave of German historical 'rewriting', the one stimulated by unification. In the beginning, when the GDR past started to become 'aufgearbeitet', political opinion leaders and commentators were setting the tone. A narrow understanding of political history, with its focus on top-level decision-making, power structures and ideology, once again became dominant. This also included narratives portraying the extreme counterpart of the GDR power-holders, that is, the groups of dissidents including the Protestant churches, who eventually played such an important part in the peaceful revolution in 1989. Political domination and repression, opposition and resistance dominated the picture.[2]

I don't question the necessity that history, as an academic practice, has to contribute to the understanding of each of these issues. However, I and a lot of my colleagues insisted, and still insist, on the necessity of broadening the scope of questions and viewpoints. The GDR as an object of historical research and of public debate should be more than a set of party and state institutions staffed by Stalinist functionaries. At any given point of time in its existence, 'GDR' signifies also some 17 million people living in those parts of Germany which happened to remain occupied by Soviet troops after 1945 and who lived their lives there over a period of up to four decades. There is no reason why we should not pay as much attention to these people as to the small minority of power holders. Their lives, their behaviour, their commitments and passivity, are as important factors of the historical entity 'GDR' as all the things we know about, for example the infighting between Ulbricht and Honecker, the details of Strauß's billion-mark-credit, etc. Or, to put it more generally: both structures of power and domination *and* social practice and experience have to be studied and debated. Only then, will 'Aufarbeitung', working through the GDR past, gain a meaning that transcends the narrowness of party politics and inner academic competition.

Taking seriously the many, 'die Vielen' (Alf Lüdtke), and focusing on their agency has been one of the central concerns of *Alltagsgeschichte*, the history of everyday life, as it developed during the 1980s in West Germany. I will therefore begin with some reflections on the reformulation of this paradigm and its integration in the new booming 'industry' of GDR history during the 1990s. I will try to assess what we can learn from this experience when considering to rewrite a comprehensive German post-war history today. This includes in particular the rewriting of West Germany's history in a changing

framework of historical perception and perspectives in the aftermath of unification.

I will proceed in three steps:

1 I will recapitulate the agenda of *Alltagsgeschichte*, as it was formulated during the late 1980s, when unification and the GDR as a field of historical research where barely conceivable,
2 I will highlight the specific potential of *Alltagsgeschichte* approaches to the history of the GDR, resulting from some peculiarities of the GDR as an object of historical research, and
3 I will try to assess the potential contribution of an *Alltagsgeschichte*-inspired historiography to the project still laying ahead of us: the rewriting of an integrated post-war German history of mutual segregation and intertwining, of *Verflechtung und Abgrenzung*, as Christoph Kleßmann formulated it in his seminal essay some seven years ago.[3]

The 1980s: *Alltagsgeschichte* and the Postmodern Condition[4]

To begin with, I have to rule out a widespread misunderstanding concerning *Alltagsgeschichte*. The term has always lent itself to the erroneous assumption that its object is primarily and exclusively 'everyday life'. Ironically, this is not the case. To make a complicated story short: there was and is no precise definition of *Alltag* as such, from which a historiographical practice developed, which then was named *Alltagsgeschichte*. The term was the outcome of a typical 'labelling effect' ensuing from debates inside and at the margins of social history in West Germany. Criticising the functional structuralism of the Bielefeld school of social history, arguments in those days focused on subjectivity, agency, micro-history, oral history, ways of living and culture (in the anthropological sense). *Alltag* was just one of several 'flags' marking new concerns and preoccupations. By finally adopting the term *Alltagsgeschichte*, historians such as Alf Lüdtke or Lutz Niethammer never intended to propagate a history restricted to everyday life, leaving out all other levels of reality. In consequence, *Alltagsgeschichte* as a term does not designate a subdiscipline of historiography defined by a particular object, but rather a shift in the perspectives of historical knowledge. This can affect a diversity of thematic fields, be it in economic or social history, in local or regional history, in women and gender history, etc.[5]

Looking back, most of the polemics between proponents of the then established social history and the challenging *Alltagshistoriker* seem somewhat exaggerated and often beside the point. In the end, some sort of truce was gained, including a minima consensus as to the necessity to widen the scope of social history on the one side, and the requirement of structural contextualisation of agency and subjectivity on the other. What is more important in the context of the problematic of rewriting, is the fact, that the emergence of *Alltagsgeschichte* cannot be explained simply as one of the many comings and goings of new fields of research inside the academy. The famous *Alltagsgeschichte* controversy at the 1984 *Historikertag* only echoed cultural and political changes outside the ivory tower, where history workshops had started to investigate the local past, be it of Nazism and resistance to Nazism, of the labour movement, of industrialisation and urbanisation, and more. As Gustav Seibt put it in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1987: 'Behind the emphatic stance of the historians of everyday life there lies an astonishing fact: history, which in Germany used to be such a solemn social science, is now the only discipline in the humanities that can boast a grassroots movement.'[6]

This grassroots movement was only one of a variety of politico-cultural movements of the time, which included the women's movement, the ecological movement, the squatters' movement in the big cities, the peace movement, and more. One of their common denominators was the challenge to 'big science', of the logics of technocratic administration and of a certain type of 'rationality'. These so-called 'new social movements'[7] only articulated and popularised the declining legitimacy of these monolithic concepts of rationality – a moment in the intellectual history of the Western world for which the French philosopher François Lyotard invented the term 'postmodern condition'. This is not to say that all everyday-life historians of the 1980s were postmodernists in the sense we would use the term nowadays. To be exact, most of them were rather uninterested in this debate. But I think that it makes sense to relate the specific position of *Alltagsgeschichte*, both in the academy and in the new social movements of the 1980s, to the bare fact that emphatically 'modern' concepts of knowledge and rationality were fundamentally delegitimised in these years.

Coming back to the methodological basic assumptions of *Alltagsgeschichte*, I propose to highlight three options, by which it distanced itself from established scholarly practice. The fact that these options now seem more or less 'harmless' and have lost their oppositional flavour, does not mean that they have become self-evident. By these three options, I mean

- the praxeological mode of knowledge
- a pluralistic concept of reality
- the notion of history as a communicative practice

Praxeological mode of knowledge is a term borrowed from Reinhard Sieder, an Austrian *Alltagshistoriker*.[8] It reflects the theoretical debts of most of *Alltagsgeschichte* to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social practice. ACCORDING to this approach, the double constitution of social reality by both 'objective' structures and ' subjective' appropriation results in a continuous change of perspectives in historiographical practice itself. Rather than privileging either structures or agency, the mediation between the two poles of social reality, and concomitantly shifting perspectives in representing past reality, are typical of its narratives. Hence the insistence of *Alltagsgeschichte* from the very start on considering micro-levels of society as important as macro-levels, on engaging in the *'jeux d'echelles'*, as Jacques Revel, a famous French proponent of micro-history has put it, the interplay of different scales of social realities.[9]

One consequence of this approach was the dissolution of a monolithic concept of reality. Rather than claiming to represent a singular, objectified version of past reality, *Alltagsgeschichte* is informed by a constructivist notion of reality. Obviously, it has this feature in common with feminist and gender history, and it was in particular feminist history which rendered this notion of constructed and multiple realities plausible in the field of history, and thereby to some extent paved the way for the acceptance of *Alltagsgeschichte*.

But a pluralistic view of reality does not necessarily imply an agnostic or relativistic attitude towards the question of which realities have which signification and social meaning, and how they are related to power structures and basic values in a given society. It just implies some reluctance on the historian's part to understand himself as thecourt of last instance, empowered to decide on something like historical 'truth'. Rather, professional historiography is seen as one among several instances in the social practice of dealing with the past. 'History' in this sense is the outcome of a communicative process, a statement which has become banal for many historians in Germany, but which was still a provocative one some fifteen years ago.

One of the privileged fields of historical research to develop and to test these basic tenets of *Alltagsgeschichte* has been contemporary history, *Zeitgeschichte*. During the 1980s, this referred mainly to the period of the Weimar Republic and above all to the Nazi dictatorship, with some investigations into early post-war history. In particular, new

insights into the involvement of 'normal' people both with the Nazi dictatorship as in the resistance against it, in the relative 'normalcy' of living under a dictatorship, contributed to an 'empowerement' of *Alltagsgeschichte* in public communication. It also left its mark on other fields of historical research, of course, but as far as the interplay between a historically interested public and the academic world is concerned, the *Zeitgeschichte* part of *Alltagsgeschichte* gained a specific meaning and relevance.

The 1990s: *Alltagsgeschichte* and the Search for the GDR Society[10]

I will now move on to the middle of the 1990s, some years after German unification. The more or less complete and unprecedented opening of the archives of a given state immediately after its sudden dissolution in itself reshaped the discipline of contemporary history. The consequences of this experience for our notion of history obviously go beyond the peculiarities of *Alltagsgeschichte*. The new boom industry of GDR history affected all historical subdisciplines, political, intellectual, women's and gender, education, diplomatic, and so on. Moreover, the GDR past was turned into a political battlefield, often resembling a minefield covered with all sorts of unexpected explosives, and this sometimes to the detriment of serious knowledge.

From the perspective of *Alltagsgeschichte*, the sudden accessibility of the new historiographical continent 'GDR' offered new possibilities for redefining its position inside of a broader concept of social history, the '*Sozialgeschichte in der Erweiterung*' (Conze). To explain this, I will focus on two aspects: the division of labour inside historiographical practice, and the peculiarities of 'GDR society' as an object of research.

Although the controversies and polemics about *Alltagsgeschichte* in the 1980s indicated some fundamental cleavages and alienation among the participants in the discussion, everyone with behind-the-scene insights knew about the relative proximity of their political and academic motives. Seen from the perspective of the academy only, it was a generation conflict inside the social history family, fuelled from outside by societal changes. Of course, *Alltagsgeschichte* as historiographical practice had to rely on the results of the already established social history from the beginning, and it could not proceed without taking into account the results of political history either. The critical reinterpretation of this knowledge to some extent implied its factual

acknowledgement; and consequently, polemics and misunderstandings began to give way to cooperation and integration already before the GDR challenge came about.[11]

Faced with the GDR as an object of historical research, a new situation emerged regarding the relations between the different historical subdisciplines and paradigms. There was no extensively researched political history, based on solid knowledge of primary sources, against which a social history could establish itself to provoke an *Alltagsgeschichte* counter-move, as we had experienced it during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in West German historiography. History of the GDR had hitherto been practised under extremely restricted conditions, relying on published material only. The results of these observations from outsiders were in some cases remarkable and can still be recommended as basic literature, as for instance Christoph Kleßmann's two volumes on the GDR[12] and the Federal Republic, the famous *DDR-Handbuch* 1985 edition[13] or the exceptional and pioneering oral history project carried out in 1988 and published in 1991 as *Die volkseigene Erfahrung* by Lutz Niethammer and his collaborators.[14] Nevertheless, it was clear that every historical subdiscipline had to start again with archival ground work. None of them could rely on an elaborated state of the art in one of the other subdisciplines. For social historians in the broad sense, this made things more complicated, since from their self-understanding they cannot dispense with politics, whereas political historians usually are licensed to leave out society.

Therefore, the sudden accessibility of the GDR field confronted *Alltagsgeschichte* with new challenges and opportunities to define its specific position inside the practice of historical research. The absence of a sound historiographical precedent constituted a particular difficulty in focusing and contextualizing typical everyday-life topics. On the other side, the peculiarities of the object in question, namely the GDR as a *society*, gave *Alltagsgeschichte* approaches a new, specific relevance.

From the outset, it was questioned by political scientists and sociologists whether the term 'society' would make any sense at all when attributed to an entity such as the population of the GDR or other populations ruled by Soviet-type totalitarianism. There was agreement on the fact that, in the long run, the primacy of party and state politics prevented any societal logic of inner differentiation, which could be seen as something relatively independent of politics. According to this argument, society was pervaded by practices of

political domination, 'durchherrscht', as a neologism invented on this occasion had it.[15] It was *durchherrscht* to the extent that, in a paradoxical inversion of Marx's utopian prophecy, it was rather society itself that had withered away during socialism, and not the state.

This argument, of course, contained some implications that were difficult to digest for any social historian looking out for a proper object of research. The argument was developed with particularly theoretical consistency by Siegrid Meuschel, drawing mainly on the discourses of legitimation and party ideology of the SED.[16] Seen from this angle, from the centre of power and ideology, the inherent logic of state socialism seemed to devour anything inside its sphere of domination the longer communist power remained intact and consolidated. From a historian's point of view, however, such an approach could only be accepted as one of several ways to thematise what the GDR was about: although it accounted for many of the actions related to the party and the state in a formal and immediate way, it explained very few things about the more remote regions of their domain, about power practices at the periphery, about the importance of informal relations and social networks underlying formal structures. To recognize that social subsystems such as the law, economic relations, exchange and distribution of goods, education and culture all had lost their relative autonomy under the prerogatives of the will of the party may help to understand the totalitarian nature of the communist utopia. But it yields no insights into the ways in which particular individuals managed to live their lives in a country whose power-holders claimed to rule according to the principles of this utopia.

To find a way out of this dilemma, a purely structural approach to social history would have been of no avail. Strictly top-down perspectives on the GDR tend to reproduce the paradox of a totally politicised society bereft of any dynamic and historical existence of its own.[17] In contrast, the empirical tools typical of *Alltagsgeschichte*, namely to confront micro- and macro-levels of power relations, to reconstruct informal network relations and their interdependency with formalised relations, and to focus on the various ways in which individuals adapted to the permanent presence of party and state domination, recommended themselves as an alternative approach. Focusing on the individuals' agency meant taking seriously their perceptions and interpretations of reality, conceiving of them as a factor of creativity in their own right, and reconstructing their sense of reality, which was different from, though not necessarily contrary to, the intentions and blueprints of the SED's project. This is – in

short – the programme of interpreting the social history of the GDR as a permanent interrelation and mutual interpenetration of '*Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn*', of the imperatives of political domination and the interests, needs and commitments inherent to the way people tried to live *their* lives.[18]

The challenge of the GDR as a field of research thus resulted in a double gain, compared to the debates and polemics during the 1980s. Introducing these new concepts in the historiography of the GDR contributed to integrating multiperspectivity in contemporary history more generally. Research projects on some aspects of GDR history will now inevitably be expected to account for the interrelationship of top-level structures and decisions and the agency at the 'bottom' of society. They have to thematise to what extent and in which ways politics and ideology were appropriated, challenged and transformed in social practice, in which ways they affected social life in the realm of *Lebenswelt* or not. On the other side, *Alltagsgeschichte* had to take politics as such more seriously than it did before. Not that *Alltagsgeschichte* had been apolitical before, rather the opposite. Nevertheless, the GDR as a riddle for social history provoked intensified concentration on the very nature of political domination conditioning social reality. The career of Alf Lüdtke's concept of '*Herrschaft als soziale Praxis*',[19] domination as social practice, may serve here to illustrate this shift of awereness: when presented in 1992, it was received as some kind of exotic mixture of Weber, Bourdieu and Foucault in the intersection of social anthropology and micro-history, but not as relevant to general contemporary history. Since then it has become a widely used label to indicate the combination of the analysis of the political and the social under the SED dictatorship, often quoted in introductions and theory chapters; it has thus been truly popularised. The same can be said about *Eigen-Sinn*, the sense-of-oneself, another *Alltagsgeschichte* concept, once widely derided, now accepted by many, in particular by younger scholars.[20]

Initially, this debate about the very existence of 'society' in the GDR was limited to some academic circles. The mainstream of public debates focused, as I indicated, on party and state action. In particular, two institutions commanding the authority and prestige of legitimate state power contributed to narrowing the view on the GDR in this sense: he Bundestag's special commission devoted to the SED-dictatorship, and the federal commissioner for the records of the GDR secret service, named *Gauck* authority after its first president.[21] The activities of these institutions, though yielding rich and detailed evidence and therefore undoubtedly of historical value, tended to

depict GDR as being composed only of either perpetrators or victims: party and state functionaries assisted by Stasi spies stood against a small minority of intellectual or Protestant dissidents. The majority of the population of the former GDR could not find many points of reference to their own experience in this narrative. Most people had been neither committed party followers nor ardent opponents, but – as in most long-term dictatorships – something in between, at some distance from both spheres, or from formal politics altogether. The sense of frustration with the historical picture designed in the sessions of the Bundestag commission and by the publications of the *Gauck* authority was increased by the massive de-industrialisation and transformation in East Germany. These were experienced not only as a material loss but also above all as an expropriation of social relations and structures, of moral values and habits, of a specific East German culture, through which GDR citizens had mastered their lives in the preceding four decades and which they now regarded as their legitimate 'Ossiness'. Following the logic of counter-reaction, 'Ostalgia', the partly romanticising, partly ironic reappropriation of the GDR's past, made its way through the media industry and consumer culture, fuelled by intellectual support from post-communist politicians and historians.

It is against the background of this dichotomic logic in the public debates about the past that a critical *Alltagsgeschichte* of the GDR is gaining particular significance. It fits well into the research strategy developed among others by the Potsdam Centre for Contemporary History to steer a course between identifying the GDR *either* with party and state repression *or* with unpolitical 'normality', harmony and idyllic niches. Thereby a differentiated perspective should replace the strict alternative of condemnation *or* idyllisation. Following this course sometimes puts you in an uncomfortable position, because neither 'side' is prepared to listen to someone proposing to make things more complicated than they already appear to be. Both extremes of the dichotomic scheme sell better in the media because they are easy to identify, reduce complexity, provide comfort to wounded souls and avoid giving bitter-tasting medicine to their respective clientels. To the followers of both positions, a critical *Alltagsgeschichte* of the GDR has to tell unpleasant things. On the one hand, it highlights the relative stability of SED domination as being based on smooth factors of domination and some consent, but only partly on physical coercion. The suppressed people did not behave that heroically at all, as simple-minded demonologies would like to have it. For most of the time, conflicts between repressive forces and opponents always remained

minority issues, with the majority standing on the sidelines. Beyond this sphere of political repression and opposition, there was much more common ground for non-violent coexistence between the regime and the population than one would expect following a dramatising view of totalitarianism. Both population and the SED shared values of material security, public order, and a sense of national pride and conventional respectability. Given the lack of alternatives, this did much to foster the regime apparent stability.[22] Such a statement does not deny the existence of political repression and of political opposition, but it sets it in a wider context of social relations and thus questions its privileged, almost 'official' status to define what the GDR was really about.

On the other hand, an *Alltagsgeschichte* integrating the social practice of domination is an antidote to any revival of 'social [or cultural] history with politics left out', which is what some intellectuals offer in order to satisfy the hunger for nostalgic GDR narratives. Such historiography tends to reconstruct a cultural peculiarity of the East German developed beyond the sphere of the political, some sort of GDR history with the terms 'SED', 'communism' and 'dictatorship' barely mentioned at all. That this view often focuses on 'culture' and its derivatives – consumer culture, reading culture, youth culture, etc. – seems plausible. Owing to their potential polyvalence, cultural practices and values are best suited for continuous reinterpretation and reappropriation. They can easily be remoulded to serve current needs. No one would try to do the same thing with the economic or political practices typical for the GDR for example, simply because they failed so drastically that they are unsuitable for any attempt at positive reinterpretation.

According to our *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn* approach, however, such reductionist conceptions miss the point when it comes to explaining how the GDR could exist as an 'ensemble of social relations', to quote the venerable Karl Marx. This ensemble did not constitute a 'society' in the developed sense of modern civil societies, but it incorporated some of its seminal elements: division of labour, industrial production, importance of higher education and of science, urbanisation, etc. The decisive difference from liberal capitalist societies must be seen in the fact that the individual spheres of the living world, the *Lebenswelten*, and the societal order in its entirety were not mediated by a differentiated set of societal sub-systems. Rather, this mediation was performed by a tightly organised, unitary set of political principles, represented and put into practice by the SED on all levels of social interaction, including the sphere of the living worlds. The latter were thus affected

and pervaded by politics to an extremely high degree. Typically, the so-called 'niches' of social relationships represented this pervasiveness of the political in everyday life in a paradoxical way. Although it was from politics that GDR citizens retreated into their relatively protected spheres of privacy, it was the state-socialist welfare policy which fostered and nurtured this space for the nuclear family to the detriment of productive investments.

The multi-functional work collective, mostly named the *Brigade*, however, undoubtedly constituted the decisive place where this interaction between communist domination and individuals took place for most of the GDR citizens. Seen from above, the work collective was designed to allow a multitude of direct political interventions. Via its shop-floor representatives the party tried to stimulate productivity, to control political and moral behaviour, to compensate for imbalances in the distribution of rare consumer goods, to provide access to culture and leisure resources, and to offer some symbols of 'imagined community' through festivities such as the International Women's Day, youth consecration or national holidays.

Only very few GDR citizens were unconnected with this workplace-centred and politically induced sociability. The vast majority of those who were, however, had quickly learned how to exploit this stick-and-carrot mixture of constraints and opportunities for their needs and interests. Accepting the offered sociability therefore did not necessarily imply embracing the political meaning with which party ideology had invested them. On the contrary, participating in the rituals of the party collective or the trade union section at the workplace entailed some minimum of co-determination at the bottom level of social relations, with the side effect that some of the unpleasant and chaoticising effects of interventions from outsiders sent by superior authorities were forestalled. The basic units of social life, those in the immediate proximity of the individual *Lebenswelt*, such as the work collective, therefore constituted the very elements of GDR society, but in a strictly monadic way. There were no means of unrestricted communication binding these units together, no uncensored representation of their interdependence beyond the scope of the individual's relations. In consequence of tight political control of any supra-individual activities such as economic planning, distribution of consumer goods, the legal system and above all the media public, 'society' in the sense of relative autonomy remained strictly limited to the small-unit level of the living world. Maintaining these limits, i.e. tolerating some self-determination at the workplace or in the village community while preventing any intrusion into the party's power monopoly on the

higher levels of social organisation, became the central function of all the elaborate repressive and controlling devices regarded as typical the late SED dictatorship.

I therefore propose that we conceive of the GDR as a dictatorship of and by boundaries (*Diktatur der Grenzen*), referring both to the outer geographical boundary protected against transgression by arms, concrete and barbed wire, and to the multitude of invisible boundaries pervading the body social, producing an inner landscape of relatively isolated units at the bottom of society. The typical political conflict between ordinary GDR citizens and the SED was *not* about political issues and basic tenets of the ideology, but about transgressions of one of these invisible boundaries, e.g. when someone took the ideology literally and tried to act it out on his own, outside the social place accorded to him by the party's omniscient wisdom.[23]

This construction principle of a 'limited', as it were, insulated and fragmented society, of course did not come into being immediately with the foundation of the GDR and it did not die away only with the U-turn in 1989 for it to take shape as the generic principle of socio-political organisation, required more than a dozen turbulent years of economic and social transformation including a near revolution in 1953, massive emigration and the setting up of *the* supreme limit to social relations, the Berlin Wall. And this process was never 'completed' or fully 'consummated'. There always existed some realms of non-aligned institutions and traditional milieux not belonging to state-socialist patterns of social relations, in particular the churches and their social microcosm.[24] Also seen from the other end of the story, the liberation of the social energies of the GDR did not start only with the developments in the autumn of 1989,[25] it had already started at some point during the 1980s, at least from the moment when perestroika seemingly legitimated the open request for alternative ways of socialism.

Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in West Germany?

Turning now to West German history, the following question has to be addressed: What do we gain from our peculiar experience with GDR *Alltagsgeschichte*, when confronted with the project of rewriting this part of post war German history, the intention of integrating both parts of German post war history? Does it make sense to transfer the *Herrschaft und-Eigen-Sinn* problematic also to West German social history? For the moment, I can only lay out some preliminary answers and suggestions as to the direction in which direction reflections could lead us in the near future.

Fortunately, an *Alltagsgeschichte* based on the experiment with the GDR case which approaches the history of the Federal Republic will find a lot of fieldwork already under way. With some delay, the history of West Germany has become a much elaborated and differentiated part of *Zeitgeschichte*, so that the massive imbalance between an over-researched GDR and an under-researched Federal Republic, which some obervers complained of until recently, is now beginning to be redressed. We can rely on substantial work on the reconstruction and modernisation period of the 1950s, on the development of mass media, consumer and leisure culture, and also on the history of political mentalities, intellectual life and public communication.[26]

Nevertheless, we must make one reservation. The first in-depth insight into West German *Alltagsgeschichte* had been presented by Lutz Niethammer's project on the life stories and social culture at Ruhr from 1930 to 1960.[27] This history of 'popular experience' – *Volkserfahrung* – ended in the 1950s, when pre-war expectations of normalcy and rising living conditions finally began to materialise for a substantial number of West Germans. Although meanwhile the making of West German society has been analysed and reconstructed from various points of view, most of this scholarship does not proceed from the standard of micro-historical perspective set by Niethammer and his collaborators. There is a certain practical rationale behind this state of knowledge. Indeed, many insights into the realities of liberal, modernizing West Germany can be gained without necessarily digging up individual community networks, workplace relations and family stories. In particular, the uncensored self-observation of the society in question, i.e. the abundant evidence produced through surveys and social science research, helps us to understand the secular changes which took place in life styles and mentalities during the 1950s and 1960s and which indeed affected the everyday lives of the many, '*der Vielen*', in a dramatic way.

But we should not content ourselves with this state of art. The differentiated interplay and unfolding of social subsystems such as the labour market and industrial relations, urban planning and neighbourhoods, social security schemes, education systems, consumer markets, the legal system and the mass media indeed represent central features of West German realities. Analysis of them yields striking insights into the continuously widening gap evolving between

the two German societies. It is particularly this potential of endogenous modernisation changing West Germany's face from the late 1950s onwards, which stood in the centre of historians' attention. But more often than not, these analyses remain on a supra-individual and even supra-regional level, portraying a society undergoing an even and more or less harmonious process of liberalisation and modernisation. The undoubted merits of these historiographical efforts lies in the the apprehension of a new quality in West Germany's relation to the past: they help us to draw lines between Germany as a post-fascist society (which was the perspective still informing the post-war parts of Niethammer's Ruhr project) and West Germany as a thriving, future-minded liberal society, which it eventually became in the 1960s and 1970s. They thus also help us to revise some leftist orthodoxies which tended to reduce the Adenauer era to post-fascist and/or capitalist restoration. But they do not pay enough attention to the ways in which these secular changes were experienced, lived through, appropriated and interpreted by West Germans at different places in different contexts.

The relevance of this dimension becomes clear if we widen our scope of historical investigation transgressing the mythical 68-border in order to include the 1970s and 1980s as well. One of the beneficial effects of the GDR-boom in German contemporary history has undoubtedly been the tearing down of some final inhibitions in the discipline to include everything up to the present as its objects of research. After all, the German post-war history we are discussing today contains four and not two decades. Unification has turned them into appropriate objects of historical research on *both* sides of the former iron curtain. Seen from the perspective of the politics of collective memory, there is no arguable reason why historians may not focus as much energy and attention on the Western part of this period, as they did with some success, as I believe, in relation to the Eastern part in recent years.

A technical argument is often raised against such an approach to widen our scope of the history of the present in the West: the 30-year period of closed records in state archives. I don't think this is a substantial argument. It relies on the assumption that 'real' history can only be gained from scrutinising secret minutes of the federal government or the memos and drafts circulating in the sphere of higher state administration. But social history and *Alltagsgeschichte* in particular can fall back on much more diversified sources, not only oral history, but in particular the material of non-governmental

institutions of all kinds: associations, foundations, non-state archives and centres of documentation, and local archives. To research, for instance, the history of inner-city urban neighbourhoods in the 1970s and 1980s, one has to rely at least as much on the sources from citizens' interest groups, urban planning agencies, cooperative housing settlements, and supervising research institutes, as on 'regular' state records. Besides this, the local public in newspapers, journals, leaflets, radio and local TV coverage, in city council committees and citizen meetings would be one of the most important aspects of such a research object, and these materials are accessible to a large part, because for the actors involved, keeping record of this public is vital for their causes and interests. Beyond this technical argument of feasibility, I would still add a strategic side remark to conclude discussion of this problem. The 30-year rule will never give way to a more transparent handling comparable to the freedom of information act in the United States if the demand for it is not put into action. Contemporary historians just have to practices it in order to challenge the legitimacy of such prerogatives of the state in such an arcane sphere.

To return to possible contents and objects of research, some propositions are now in place as to what an *Alltagsgeschichte*-informed rewriting of the Federal Republic's history should be about. Which objects should such a historiography of the Federal Republic focus on in order to contribute to the rewriting of post-war German history? One could break down this problem according to some already more or less conventional dimensions of modern societies, namely class, gender and ethnicity ('race' being a term definitely 'spoiled' for the German scientific vocabulary). I will, however, focus my remarks on gender, since it seems to me particularly well suited to be set against the East German 'case' in order to gain differentiated insights into the relation between the socio-political system and individual lives.

The work of the American historian Bob Moeller and some other younger American and German historians is central here. It treats the interrelation of post-war reconstruction and gender relations, from the top political level down to way of living, consumer culture and back.[28] The reordering of gender relations, namely the reinstitution of the male-breadwinner-housewife-model as the social norm of family units by and through economic and social policies during the 1950s, stands in the centre of this approach. It argues that gender politics played a vital role in defining the participation of the West German citizenship: via the entitlements handed out to a particular

type of families, via the propagation of affluence in family (and not in collective institutions), the re-establishment of political and societal order was articulated in accordance with a particular version of the patriarchal gender hierarchy. This process was one seminal consequence of (democratically legitimised) political domination, deeply affecting the everyday life of the many. Through structural and ideological incentives, the social and psychic energies of the individuals were driven to construct and nurture spaces of intimacy and privacy. The outcome of this process was the 'modern', middle-class oriented, individualized West German *Bundesbürger*. The underlying and redefined family-gender concept negated both Weimar class-based concepts of social policy and Nazi blood-and-soil ideology.

The provocative thrust of this argument can be carried beyond the period for which it has been developed into the crucial period, when this re-established gender order was fundamentally questioned and challenged by the very generation that had been raised under its seemingly unrestricted rule. I think that this subject constitutes a realm in which the political and the personal are most densely intervowen, thereby offering itself as a point of departure for the *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn* perspective. There are already research projects under way or already completed, which support this perspective, some even containing a comparison between East and West.[29]

Comparisons between the two German societies show two fundamentally different ways of combining the given gender hierarchy with the political: In the East, the policy towards women aimed primarily at the mobilization of additional labour for the planned economy including the considerable extra costs for collective childcare and all the other workplace-related entitlements. In this state-socialist model the nuclear family was not dissolved at all. On the contrary, the women in particular always had to bear the double burden of gainful employment and housework. Thereby, family households became a kind of hinterland of the state economy, necessary for the reproduction of the workforce, but also for compensating the misfortunes of a planned economy. In ideological and symbolical terms, however, they always remained marginal or at least secondary. They remained central for everyone's socialization, but considerably dispowered by the centrality of workplace relations, as I described them above. Ironically, it was the state-citizen relationship in the extra-familiar sphere which at the same time was articulated through an intensely familiaristic rhetoric. The party and state posed and acted as 'parents'

taking care of their 'children' thus undermining the symbolic and material autonomy of the 'real' families.

By contrast the West German male-breadwinner-housewife unit gained a pivotal socio-political function, which not only was acclaimed in public discourses, but was of central material and psychological importance. A recent study on the life stories of handicapped war veterans in West Germany, based on a secondary evaluation of interviews of the former Niethammer oral history project, yields very interesting insights into this problem.[30] The results of Vera Neumann's study on the integration of handicapped war veterans show how the family policy of the 1950s helped to privatise the social costs of the war. It was through private care and self-help, mostly borne by female relatives, that the imperatives of acquisitiveness and gainful employment as the *ultima ratio* of social policy were mediated and made effective in order to restore male breadwinners. *Beziehungsarbeit* and *Familienarbeit* as a particular resource to be provided by private households within a tight hierarchical gender setting can thus be reconstructed as the sphere where structures of domination, and the individual's needs and interests, met and were articulated to each other. As in other studies, the nuclear family emerges as the particular site of West German reconstruction society in a very complex and productive way. It is in this particular reconstitution that the imperatives of political domination and individual agency, that *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn* interacted to reconstruct the basic fabric of West Germany's modernising society.

Assessing the importance of the nuclear family as an object of social policy, but also as an agent of social change should not be restricted to the reconstruction period in the 1950s. Looking back to the 1950s, 'the' family as social institution was often criticised as a symbol of the conservative patriachalism which went hand in hand with an underdeveloped civic culture. If we look beyond the 1950s however, into the 1960s and 1970s, we may detect more creative aspects of this post-war family order. From one point of view, this fundamental change of the family from the 1970s onwards has often been described in a pessimistic way as a mainly destructive process heralding the decline of the family as such. But the very fact of its quality as *the* site of the new Federal German citizenship also set free energies and potentials with far-reaching political consequences. It was in these families where housewives, having sacrificed their professional careers, concentrated on their children's education, and taught their sons and above all their daughters to aspire to professional training

and/or higher education. These nuclear families were future-minded projects, nurturing aspirations which would eventually contribute to the expansion of the West German higher education system, as well as to the concomitant social mobility, profoundly changing the face of West Germany as a class society.

The creativity of this institution can also be seen under a further aspect. The intensity and severity with which the opponents of 1968 confronted each other must to a great extent be explained by its quality as a generation conflict. The students' rebellion was among others largely based on intra-family conflicts going public, conflicts that had been nurtured and fuelled during these post-war family-breeding years. The repressed energies of these family relations could be mobilised for fundamental changes in society, until they were converted into open conflicts, and finally channelled in several though ambivalent ways. They found their continuation in the reform politics of the early 1970s as well as in the simultaneous confrontation between the remaining hardliners of both sides, when not only left-wing terrorism, but also non-violent variants of left-wing radicalism were countered by new, unprecedented levels of police prevention and surveillance.

The decisive change of these years, however, concerned the definitions of politics itself. One of the most popular slogans of the 1970s went: 'The private is political, and the political is private', thus transcending the narrow limits of formal politics themselves. Questioning conventional family structures and sexual relations became one of the fundamental agendas, thereby reaffirming in a paradoxical way the very centrality that the 'private' sphere had been attributed in early West German society. It is also from this experience that the 1968 radicalism could be converted into a bundle of subcultural projects and single-issue campaigns which eventually would form the so-called new social movements of the late 1970s and 1980s, contributing to the profound innovation of West German society and political culture. It was in these years that new or hitherto marginalised forms of privacy became a pivotal point in the development of new ways of living, claiming public recognition and becoming politically legitimised: single parenthood, living cooperatives, homosexual partnerships and other forms of living communities.

Returning to the comparative perspective with GDR history, this peculiar connection between the family-centredness of early West Germany as a political society has to be kept in mind. One of the striking differences in the social history of the two post-war Germanies is the productive dynamic of a generation conflict in the West, and

its absence, or at least the protracted inability to draw productive energies from the existing generation tensions, in the East. I cannot go into more details on this particular question,[31] I just mention it in order to show that reconstructing the close interrelation of the political and the private, of political domination and the needs and interests of individuals, their *Eigen-Sinn*, is central also for a critical understanding of West Germany's history, above all if we progress into the dynamics of its later decades, the 1970s and 1980s.

As heuristic hypotheses for future comparative narratives, I therefore propose to set the nuclear family of the Federal Republic against the East German work collective as the paradigmatic mode by which to mediate imperatives of the politico-ideological, social and economic system. On a systemic level of analysis, one could possibly speak of functional equivalents in the reproduction of power relations. Above all, it has to be remembered that the historical strength of the West German 'model' of family-centred citizenship was not least *made possible* by the fact that from the outset it was established as a counter-model to the state-socialist way of life, or: 'in the nuclear age of the Cold War, nuclear families were the first line of defence against the communist menace', as Robert Moeller puts it.[32] To continue the metaphor: they acted as the nuclear reactor breeding the psychic energies under high pressure of rigid sets of conventions which eventually would find their outlet during the generation conflict of the 1960s. The propagation and ideology of the family had been part and parcel of the Cold War rhetoric. By contrast, 'work', 'workers' and 'production' were similarly ideologised in the GDR. Here it was the work collective as the site of social interaction, to which GDR citizens were expected to attach their emotions and from which they were supposed to draw their mental energies and strength. While Ludwig Erhard promised every citizen his share in decidedly private *Bürgerlichkeit* (negating old-style 'proletarian' collectivism in the East), Ulbricht tried to focus and mobilize all energies on the workplace, the central place of social participation.

In this sense, one of the important tasks of rewriting post-war West German history could be to show to what extent West Germany's own successful development was at the same time conditioned by Germany's division into two states and societies – and that by now, this division becoming history, also these conditions are at stake. The case of the nuclear family and gender politics contrasted to the work collective as the dominating unit of socialisation is just one of several areas during the construction period which promise new insights into the

very nature by which the Cold War and the division of the country deeply affected society on both sides. Exploration of this field may give contemporary history an important say in the ongoing process of fundamental reorientation in unified Germany. The changing patterns of family and generational behaviour, and the concomitant demographic changes, already deeply affect our social security system. Fundamental reforms in this area as well as in the field of immigration policy and citizenship definition requiring a broad consensus in society are one of its long-term consequences. Almost everyone knows that the schemes and models institutionalized during the 1950s will not survive the next decades unmodified.

This was already debated at length by experts during the late 1980s. But post-unification euphoria, in particular among the political and economic elites, had fostered a sense of West Germany living in a post-historical paradise. Thereby, seemingly nothing had to change fundamentally, but only in terms of extension and expansion, following the principle 'more of the same', and in strict contrast to East Germany, where apparently *everything* had to change. Only now is the urge for change, the need of reorientiation already articulated during the late 1980s but muted by unification euphoria, becoming widely felt inside West German society also.

A critical re-examination and combination of both post-war German histories and their intense intertwinings could thus help to foster the sense of *venture* needed both in East and West Germany in order to find solutions for the problems of unified Germany. The East Germans dared to engage in such a venture some ten years ago, and the endless stream of stories told about their GDR experience in all their varieties and differences gradually communicates the causes and motives of this venture. They slowly begin to become part of a shared collective memory of post-war German history.[33] It seemingly took ten years, before large parts of West German society began to realise that in their world too, fundamental changes could no longer be avoided, that a lot of things would not remain the same, and that history moving on meant more than just moving the federal government from Bonn to Berlin.

Notes

1. See, for example, F. Pflüger, *Ehrenwort. Das System Kohl und der Neubeginn* (Stuttgart, Munich 2000).

2. It is not by chance, I think, that early exceptions to this mainstream originated rather from the Anglo-Saxon community of German history specialists, such as the meritorious works by M. Fulbrook, e.g. *Anatomy of a Dictatorship. Inside the GDR, 1949–1989* (Oxford, 1995).
3. C. Kleßmann, 'Verflechtung und Abgrenzung. Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte', *Aus Parlament und Zeitgeschichte* B 29–30/93, pp. 30–41.
4. This part rehearses some ideas originally published together with Michael Wildt, 'Radical Plurality: History Workshops as a Practical Critique of Knowledge', *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 33 (1992), pp. 73–99.
5. The essay collection in A. Lüdtke (ed.), *Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen* (Frankfurt a. M., 1989) (Engl. translation *The History of Everyday Life. Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, trans. W. Templer [Princeton, 1995]) can be regarded as representative of the positions and conceptions in the *Alltagsgeschichte* spectrum during the 1980s.
6. Quoted in Lindenberger and Wildt, 'Radical Plurality', p. 74.
7. See Forschungsgruppe Neue Soziale Bewegungen (ed.), *Forschungsjournal Neue soziale Bewegungen*, Opladen 1 (1988)–13 (2000).
8. R. Sieder, 'Sozialgeschichte auf dem Weg zu einer historischen Kulturwissenschaft?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 20 (1994), pp. 445–68.
9. J. Revel (ed.) *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris, 1996).
10. For a more elaborated version of this argument see my 'Alltagsgeschichte und ihr Beitrag zur Erforschung der Sozialgeschichte der DDR', in R. Bessel and R. Jessen (eds), *Die Grenzen der Diktatur. Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR* (Göttingen, 1996), pp. 298–325.
11. Cf. J. Kocka, '"Historische Sozialwissenschaft" und "Alltagsgeschichte"', in idem (ed.), *Sozialgeschichte* (2nd enlarged ed, Göttingen 1986), pp. 162–74.
12. C. Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 5th edn, 1991); idem, *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation: deutsche Geschichte 1955–1970* (Göttingen, 1988).
13. Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen (ed.), *DDR-Handbuch* (3rd edn, Cologne, 1985).
14. L. Niethammer, A. von Plato and D. Wierling, *Die volkseigene Erfahrung: eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR. 30 biographische Eröffnungen* (Berlin 1991).
15. The term was coined by A. Lüdtke, '"Helden der Arbeit" – Mühen beim Arbeiten. Zur mißmutigen Loyalität von Industriearbeitern in der DDR', in H. Kaelble et al. (eds), *Sozialgeschichte der DDR* (Stuttgart, 1994), pp. 188–213, and picked up by J. Kocka, 'Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft', in ibid., pp. 547–53.
16. Cf. S. Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–1989* (Frankfurt a. M., 1992);

R. Jessen, 'Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 21 (1995), pp. 96–110.

17. K. Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat. Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR* (Munich, 1986) can be regarded as representative of such state-centred narratives.
18. Cf. my 'Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur Einleitung', in idem (ed.), *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR* (Cologne, 1999), pp. 13–44.
19. A. Lüdtke, 'Einleitung: Herrschaft als soziale Praxis', in idem (ed.), *Herrschaft als soziale Praxis, Historische und sozial-anthropologische Studien* (Göttingen, 1991), pp. 9–63.
20. Idem, *Eigen-Sinn. Fabrikalltag, Arbeitserfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus* (Hamburg, 1993), and idem, 'Cash, Coffee-Breaks, Horseplay: *Eigensinn* and Politics among Factory Workers in Germany circa 1900', in M. Hanagan and Ch. Stephenson (eds), *Confrontation. Class Consciousness, and the Labor Process. Studies in Proletarian Class Formation* (New York et al., 1986), pp. 65–95.
21. Cf. J. Yoder, 'Truth without Reconciliation: An Appraisal of the Enquete Commission on the SED Dictatorship in Germany', *German Politics* 8 (1999), pp. 59–80; B. Miller, *Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany. Stasi Informers and their Impact on Society* (London, 1999).
22. The interplay of the leadership's mistrust of outside influences and xenophobic attitudes of the population are a case in point, cf. J. Behrends, D. Kuck and P. G. Poutrus, 'Historische Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in den Neuen Bundesländern', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B39/2000, pp. 15–21.
23. Sandrine Kott discusses the inherent ambivalences of this basic mode of socialisation through work collectives, emphasising their familiaristic practices limited by the paternalistic tutelage of party control and interference, cf. S. Kott, 'Collectifs et communauté dans les entreprises de RDA: limites de la dictature ou dictature des limites?', *Genèses* 39 (June 2000), pp. 27–51.
24. Cf. Fulbrook, *Anatomy*, ch. 4: 'Render to Caesar? The Pivotal Role of the Protestant Church'.
25. Cf. A. O. Hirschmann, *A Propensity of Self-Subversion* (Cambridge/Mass., 1995)
26. See A. Schildt and A. Sywottek (eds), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1993); Robert G. Moeller (ed.), *West Germany under Construction. Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, 1997).
27. Cf. L. Niethammer and A. von Plato, *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930–1960*, vols. 1–3 (Bonn, 1983–5).
28. Cf. the seminal R. G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley et al., 1993), for an overview on similar approaches cf. idem, 'Introduction: Writing the History of West Germany', in idem (ed.), *West Germany*, pp. 1–30.

29. G.-F. Budde (ed.), *Frauen arbeiten. Weibliche Erwerbstätigkeit in Ost- und Westdeutschland nach 1945* (Göttingen, 1997).
30. V. Neumann, *Nicht der Rede wert: die Privatisierung der Kriegsfolgen in der frühen Bundesrepublik. Lebensgeschichtliche Erinnerungen.* Mit einem Vorwort von Lutz Niethammer (Münster, 1999).
31. Cf. Dorothee Wierling in this volume.
32. Moeller, 'Introduction', p. 16.
33. Cf. T. Lindenberger, 'Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Das Alltagsleben der DDR und sein Platz in der Erinnerungskultur des vereinten Deutschlands', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 40/2000, pp. 5–12.