"One Million Antisemites?" Attitudes toward Jews, the Holocaust, and Israel: An Anthropological Study of Refugees in Contemporary Germany

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"One Million Antisemites?" Attitudes toward Jews, the Holocaust, and Israel

An Anthropological Study of Refugees in Contemporary Germany

Sina Arnold and Jana König

This article analyzes the attitudes of 25 refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, now living in Germany, toward Jews, the Holocaust, Israel, and the Middle East conflict. It reveals both anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments among many of the respondents, as well as a lack of knowledge about the Holocaust, and a wide range of attitudes between individual participants. Some of the factors influencing attitudes include everyday knowledge in the countries of origin, Arab nationalism, as well as specific religious and ethnic identities. The findings are discussed in relation to other recent studies, and against the backdrop of German media discourse, current debates about an "imported" antisemitism among refugees and migrants, and the relationship between experiences of racial discrimination and anti-Jewish attitudes.

In November 2016, wildfires broke out in Israel and some were believed to be started by arsonists. While the Palestinian Authority sent fire-fighting teams to assist around Beit Meir, there were also Arabs on social media celebrating that the Jewish state was in flames.[1] Erika Steinbach, then a member of the German Parliament

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from the conservative Christian Democratic Union party (CDU), tweeted: "[i]n a year we'll have more than one million additional antisemites in Germany," emphasizing her message with three crying emojis.[2] Steinbach was referring to the refugees who came to Germany during the "long summer of migration"[3] in 2015.[4] Her tweet is indicative of both social reality and specific discourse. On the one hand, she is referencing the widespread antisemitism that exists in some Arab countries, and on the other hand, the tweet is an example of a frequent, premature connection made between the existence of Arab antisemitism and the refugees coming to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa. The connection is often based on gross generalizations and stereotypical thinking.

These recent migratory movements reached Europe at a crucial time. Terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Berlin had rocked the entire continent, fueling a general fear of Islamist terrorism. Some of these worries were instrumentalized into blatant racism by right-wing groups and political parties. The success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and their recent entry into government indicates growing resistance against refugees and migrants settling in Germany. This is in addition to the 2,218 officially registered attacks on refugee centers between 2014 and 2016,[5] and 2,554 physical attacks on refugees in 2016 alone, underscoring the violent potential of such movements.[6] Moreover, approval ratings for antisemitism remain high: up to 30 percent of the German population hold secondary antisemitic opinions and about 10 percent exhibit classical antisemitic sentiments. The approval rating for antisemitism directed against Israel is at about 20 percent.[7]

Jewish Fears Increase in Western Europe

This atmosphere is perceived as threatening by many Jews in Germany, and across Europe as well. According to a study of Jewish leadership by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, many see antisemitism as a potential danger to their communities.[8] In a 2013 survey conducted by the European Union Agency for

Fundamental Rights among Jews in eight European Union states, 66 percent said that antisemitism is a problem.[9] One prominent European example is the case of France, where fears are growing from terrorist attacks on Jewish institutions and individuals, such as the case of Sarah Halimi who was tortured and subsequently thrown out of a window in 2017, and 85 year old Holocaust survivor Mireille Knoll who was tortured and set on fire one year later.[10] In Germany, a recent quantitative survey among 553 Jews reports that 78 percent have seen an increase in antisemitism and 83 percent believe this increase will continue in the coming years.[11] In addition, Jews express worries about being visibly Jewish in public.[12] One reason for current fears is that an increasing number of refugees from primarily Arab countries could also bring in more antisemitism; 56 percent express worry about more physical attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions by those very refugees.[13] Qualitative interviews revealed the same concern, both that refugees could bring in antisemitism from their home countries and that Muslim migrants who were raised in Germany could harbor antisemitism.[14] This was mirrored in our own study, where Jewish expert interviewees also confirmed their concern about an increase in antisemitism and a sense of growing threat. They cite the wider context of antisemitism in Europe, increasing Islamist terrorism, and also concerns linked to current migration movements. The lack of media coverage of antisemitic violence is also mentioned, as is the perceived lack of support from the German majority in society. One interview partner sums up this fundamental uncertainty as a "suitcase mood," as many of her Jewish acquaintances and friends in Germany ask themselves whether they should emigrate in view of the perceived increase in antisemitism.

Media Discourse and Discussion

Soon after the numbers of refugees arriving in Germany rose in 2015, the media began to discuss possible prejudices held by the newcomers. Alongside expected sexism and homophobia,

antisemitism was also anticipated. "Are the Refugees bringing more Antisemitism to Germany?," the left-leaning national daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* asked.[15] "What happens to the Jew-hatred of the Refugees?," asked the conservative newspaper *Die Welt,*[16] while the Berlin-based *Tagesspiegel* expressed "Worries about New Antisemitism due to Refugees,"[17] and others spoke about "imported" antisemitism.[18] A variety of similar headlines were also published.[19]

The issue was discussed internationally as well. The third conference of the "Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism" (ICCA) was held in Berlin in March 2016, gathering about 140 politicians from more than 40 countries. Internationally renowned antisemitism scholars like Alvin Rosenfeld explicitly suggested educating refugees from countries in which anti-Israel attitudes are common.[20] German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert warned attendees against a rise in antisemitism due to an increase of migration. Media coverage of the conference was dominated by this sentiment as well, including a story by German radio station *Deutsche Welle* entitled "When Refugees bring Antisemitism."[21] That same month, the international Rabbi's Conference had welcomed refugees to Europe but also emphasized the necessary tasks of integration and anti-antisemitism education.[22]

In these debates, the likelihood of antisemitism among the incoming refugees was partly attributed to their Muslim heritage[23] but also to socialization in their home countries.[24] Despite having a strong presence in media coverage, the refugees themselves were rarely heard. Similarly, the voices of Muslim and migrant communities in Germany were largely ignored. Only rarely did journalists speak with refugees, and when they did they employed a non-scientific and largely anecdotal approach.[25]

These debates revived the recurring question of the relationship between antisemitism among the German majority and various minorities in society, a very sensitive subject in Germany and in Europe more generally. Here, antisemitism had been attributed primarily to people with a migration background, mostly from Muslim

countries. But, as the anthropologist Esra Özyürek states, focusing on "the Muslims" always carries the twofold danger of generalizing a heterogeneous group and relativizing the antisemitism of the majority.[26] However, in complex societies it is necessary to differentiate content, attitudes, and influences and to identify religious or political specificities where possible. This underscores the need for empirical studies of the scope, shape, and reasons for refugee attitudes toward Jews and Judaism.

To further complicate matters, in public debates the terms "migrants," "Muslims," and "refugees" are often conflated. For the purpose of this article, the term "refugee" refers to people who have left their home country for political, religious, or economic reasons; a "migrant" refers to those who have immigrated to Germany and do not yet hold citizenship (including refugees); the phrase "migration background" refers to people who have either migrated themselves or have at least one parent who migrated to Germany, and who may or may not hold German citizenship; and, a "Muslim migration background" is a migration background from predominantly Muslim countries, however, this does not necessarily mean that the person is Muslim as they may also be Christian, Yazidi, or atheist. "Muslim" refers to those who identify themselves as Muslim.

The Current State of Research

In recent years, Germany has produced several scientific studies of refugees.[27] Not all of them, however, are representative samples.[28] Qualitative or non-representative quantitative studies have often focused on specific regions, and none have concentrated explicitly on prejudice. Therefore, public debate generally relies on empirical studies focused on migrants from primarily Muslim countries.[29] While doubts are warranted regarding a problematic categorization as "Muslim" in some studies, they nevertheless provide a starting point to look at the distribution of prejudice and its influence. Quantitative analysis, like that of the so-called "Mitte" study by

Leipzig University, shows higher approval rates among the Muslim population regarding primary antisemitism compared to the non-Muslim population (16.7 percent as opposed to 11.5 percent, respectively), including agreements with statements such as "Jews have too much control and influence on Wall Street." But for secondary antisemitism, the consent values among Muslims are lower (20.8 percent as compared to 23.8 percent among non-Muslims), reflected in statements such as "Jews today use the memory of the Holocaust for their own advantage."[30]

An empirical study by Jürgen Mansel and Viktoria Spaiser concludes that adolescents with a migrant background from Muslim majority countries tend to show higher rates of antisemitic attitudes than their contemporaries without this background. At the same time, the authors see large differences inside those groups depending on education and the family's region of origin.[31] Günther Jikeli's comparative European study revealed similarities in antisemitic attitudes among young Muslim men in Germany, France, and Great Britain.[32] Qualitative studies, especially among adolescents, do identify specific motivations, intentions, and forms of expressions compared to adolescents without a Muslim migrant background.[33] However, it is not possible to simply transfer these findings to refugees. Their uncertain legal status, specific histories of migration, immediate experiences in their countries of origin, and the very diverse requirements of participating in German society necessitate a more nuanced look at the situation of refugees.

At the time of writing, there were only two quantitative studies of refugees in Germany that include one item about Jews each,[34] and only one extensive qualitative study with refugee interview partners. This study by Günther Jikeli, published in December 2017, is based on 16 group interviews with 68 refugees from Syria and Iraq. Antisemitic patterns and stereotypes were widespread throughout all the interviews, though interviews revealed a wide range of attitudes toward Jews: from positive or neutral, to a belief in conspiracy theories, to genocidal attitudes. The answers demonstrated a significant discrepancy between members of the majority population and

members of local ethnic and religious minorities in the respective country of origin. In particular, the Kurdish interview partners showed some pro-Jewish and pro-Israel positions. The study identifies six factors of influence for anti-Jewish attitudes: a normalized antisemitism within the society and social circles of the country of origin; antisemitic propaganda in the country of origin, including school education; media propagating antisemitic stereotypes; an identification with Palestinians that generates immediate hostility towards Israel and Jews; Pan-Arabic ideology; and certain interpretations of Islam.[35]

Two more current studies also deal with the subject matter. David Ranan interviewed 70 Muslims in Germany and the UK, including several recent refugees, investigating possible antisemitic attitudes. He does not, however, draw any specific conclusions for this subgroup.[36] Regarding Muslim attitudes in general, Ranan found the presence of a wide array of stereotypes, including conspiracy theories about Jews. The findings also showed that the Middle East conflict is a central influence on attitudes toward Jews, that the terms "Jew," "Israeli," and "Zionist" are often conflated, and that the Koran does not play a major role in creating opinions about Jews.[37] A qualitative five-nation study commissioned by the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, Future" (EVZ) analyzed possible connections between antisemitism and recent immigration.[38] The country report for Germany, conducted by Mathias Berek, included 29 expert interviews with people working with recent migrants or involved with state and civil society organizations.[39] The study's focus was less on specific stereotypes and more on investigating whether the arrival of Middle East and North African (MENA) migrants since 2011 has caused a rise in antisemitism. The experts did not support this claim, however, no refugees were interviewed directly. While there was no doubt that a certain amount of MENA migrants held antisemitic attitudes, no visible rise in antisemitism could be noted based on the interviews and recent survey data. The study also noted a tendency among German Muslim associations and congregations to deny the existence of antisemitism among Muslims.

Methodology and Sample

Against the backdrop of this small number of studies, our research analyzes the attitudes of refugees toward Jews, as well as toward Israel, the Middle East conflict, and the Holocaust, based upon the findings of a qualitative study.[40] Secondly, we examine factors that influence these attitudes. Going beyond the data, we also compare our findings to those of the other recent studies, thus giving a broader picture of antisemitic attitudes among refugees in Germany. Building upon our findings, we focus on three questions and the analytical consequences for researching antisemitism among minorities: what is the significance of social and historical contexts in understanding antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes; to what degree are the findings from studies on Muslim migrants or their descendants transferable to current refugees; and, what role does the experience of racism play as an influencing factor in antisemitic attitudes?

Our study was conducted in Berlin from August to October 2016. In total, we conducted 25 interviews lasting between 20 and 100 minutes.[41] The interviews took place in Arabic and Farsi with the help of interpreters. The sections translated into German during the interview were subsequently transcribed and are the basis of the evaluation. Among the interviewees were 16 men and nine women, all between 16 and 53 years of age. All of them came from an urban environment, and more than half came from the capital of their respective country of origin. Our selection focused on the three most important countries of origin among refugees in 2016: Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Combined, these countries accounted for 71.5 percent of all initial asylum applications.[42] All but four interview partners declared themselves Muslim: of 25 interviewees, 15 pray regularly, seven fast, eight go to mosque often, and half of the women wear a hijab. Regarding their choice of mosque, most decided based on geographical proximity or family connections—none decided on the basis of the mosque's ideology. The survey includes questions on their living situation

and experiences of discrimination in Germany, identity (political, ethnic, religious), attitudes regarding diversity and minorities, perceptions of Jews, as well as knowledge (and sources of knowledge) regarding the Middle East conflict, Israel, and the Holocaust. In addition to the refugee interview, we also interviewed 14 experts that work in Jewish and non-Jewish civic organizations that work directly with refugees. These respondents were asked about their assessment of the political climate in Germany, as well as their experiences regarding antisemitism and forced migration. The study utilizes an ethnographic approach which, in addition to guided qualitative interviews, also recognizes the social environment of the interviewees.

Although some interviewees welcomed questions about their political opinions and were eager to discuss topics aside from their flight histories, there was also skepticism regarding the topic of the study and its potential implications. One inhabitant of a refugee home where other scholars had conducted interviews said: "yet another study. They all think we are part of ISIS. We sleep with women, we go to clubs and drink—what is it that you want?"[43] And: "if you're identified as an Arab or a Muslim you're immediately asked 'what do you think about Israel?'" Another interviewee noted that Germans "expect an Arab to be a fan of Hitler." It can thus be assumed that many refugees are conscious of the public perception of them as potential carriers of antisemitism, and as a result their answers are given with a certain degree of social desirability in mind. This wariness is possibly increased by the taboo regarding subjects like Israel, which we will elaborate on later, as well as the precarious legal situation of the interviewees, many of whom were awaiting decisions on their asylum applications at the time of the study. This reality means that many live under the constant threat of deportation while at the same time being dependent on German authorities and other federal institutions. Even though we guaranteed anonymity to our interviewees, with these factors in mind it is to be expected that our communication was not necessarily a completely open and honest one.[44]

The Living Situation of Refugees in Germany

In our study, we asked the refugees to describe their living situation to better understand their statements in their actual social context. Where and how, for instance, do they meet Jews? What kind of discrimination do they face? What religious practices do they follow? We used this approach of describing everyday life in order to examine the question of whether a relationship exists between discrimination and antisemitic attitudes or actions.

The respondents described the living situation in collective housing as challenging, confirming the findings of recent empirical studies.[45] At the time of the interviews, only a few of them lived in their own space or shared an apartment, most were sleeping in dorms housed in old gyms, hangars, or former office buildings. They lamented the sanitary conditions and lack of privacy, as well as conflicts among inhabitants stemming from living in a cramped and tense atmosphere. The wait for decisions on their asylum applications was also described as tiring, with the process itself being uncertain and producing a looming fear of deportation. Life was generally perceived as boring, interrupted only in some cases by language classes. Many interviewees have experienced discrimination in Germany. About one fifth experienced denigrating comments or unfriendly looks at their hijab. Some of them were afraid of being attacked by neo-Nazis, though this happens less in Berlin and more in outlying regions.[46] The respondents were also aware of how the concern about terrorism and Islamism influences the general perception of refugees by the majority population. Almost all of them judged conflicts inside the Muslim community as less relevant in Germany and feel they now enjoy a greater freedom of religion and a reduced politicization of faith. Accordingly, there were few indications of recruiting efforts by radical Islamist groups among the inhabitants of refugee shelters.[47] Due to their experience with Islamism in their countries of origin, some refugees consciously avoided places where they would meet such groups. Many reported that they practiced their religion less, or more privately, than in

their country of origin—whether the fear of Islamism is the decisive factor here is difficult to say.

Contact with Jews and Perceptions of Jews

A majority of the interviewees expressed antisemitic resentment. In most cases, the statements were fragmented and riddled with inner contradictions. Only one female interview partner had a coherent antisemitic worldview: the rejection of "the Jews" as well as the Jewish state was crucial to the self-image of this 20-year-old Palestinian woman from Damascus. The ideological character of her antisemitism was professed in the sentence: "I don't know any [Jews] but I simply hate them." The negative image of Jews shared by the majority of interviewees sometimes reproduced stereotypes constitutive of primary antisemitism: Jews are associated with money and power[48] or attributed a global influence and responsibility for "wars in the world," which "includes this one now in Syria." This imagery was sometimes connected to the stereotype of Jews being cunning and calculating. In a few cases, there were indications of conspiratorial thinking in which Jews were made responsible for negative events in the world. Jews were also said to be "immoral and inhuman." One female respondent accused Jews of portraying Islam as wholly negative, therefore "showing the world that Islam is bad and Muslims are bad people" and thus were responsible for anti-Muslim racism.

Not only are the stereotypes of a fragmentary nature, the interview partners also proclaim knowing only little about Jews and Judaism. Their knowledge comes primarily from family members, acquaintances, and friends. Two interviewees who came to Berlin from Syria five years ago described antisemitic knowledge as a form of "everyday life knowledge": "people are coming here, packed with ideas. And it takes a long time to see where it comes from and how ingrained it is in society and tradition. For instance, in saying or in the vernacular, there is already a lot of antisemitism." Part of this everyday life knowledge includes regional histories of relations between Jews and Muslims that sometimes also counter

antisemitic attitudes: "my grandma said that before the foundation of Israel, Jews were in Iraq and all of the Arab countries. They were a minority in Iraq and Syria. I think that Jews have lived in all our countries for ages. Before they were driven to Israel they had houses and a lot of money in these countries. But the presidents who ruled these countries back then took their money and their houses and this is how they were driven to Israel. I think that Jews have been here for ages." School, however, was not mentioned as a source of knowledge about Jews. Neither was the Koran mentioned often, although in the few instances interview partners referred to historical conflicts between Mohammed and the Jewish communities of Medina. Other refugees emphasized that the Koran was not a source of negative images of Jews for them.

About half of the interviewees obtained their knowledge of Jews via day-to-day contacts. In some cases, this interaction already existed in the countries of origin. One Iraqi remembered: "I visited my grandpa often, who lived in Baghdad back then and his neighbors were Jews. They also came to my grandpa's house and we cooked together and ate together and vice-versa." Likewise, a Syrian said: "I know a Jew who was a pharmacist. He had a pharmacy in Syria and was simply a nice person." However, half of the interviewees' contact with Jews came only after arriving in Germany: one shared apartment had Jewish roommates, there were Jewish students in the language class, as well as Jews being among the volunteers working with refugees. The description of interactions between refugees and Jews ranged from neutral to positive. Negative attitudes against "the Jews" as an abstract entity did not seem to hinder the development of personal relationships.

Attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East Conflict

Almost all interviewees were critical toward Israel. Some of them expressed concrete criticism of state policies against the Palestinians, but with others there was a generalizing criticism, for instance, labeling Israel a fully racist country. The notion of an occupying or

colonial power that stole the "Arab," "Muslim," or "Palestinian" land was commonly expressed. One of the interviewees lamented the religious character of the country: "for me, Israel is a religious country or a country that emerged on the basis of religion. A land that also the international community has created in Palestine. For me, whether I am an Arab or not—and I am no Muslim, to begin with—a religious state is inacceptable." His criticism, however, was not confined to Israel alone—as an atheist, he also extended it to Iran: "Iran is unacceptable as well, because it is a religious state." Israel was sweepingly characterized as the "most influential state in the world" and powerful far beyond its actual size, responsible "for all wars in the world" including "the current war in Syria." In characterizations like "they control everything," conspiratorial thinking is visible, alleging that the Jewish state is able to control world events. One fifth of the interviewees denied Israel's right to exist, expressed in statements like "I don't believe in the existence of an Israeli state" or "Israel? No, I cannot recognize Israel." Reproducing anti-Zionist and antisemitic stereotypes, Israel was described as an artificial state, "a state born out of nothing." However, there are also refugees, particularly from Afghanistan, who had a more neutral position toward the Jewish state—a "country like every other." In this regard, a majority of respondents emphasized the distinction between Jews, Israelis, and the state of Israel. This is expressed in statements like: "we differentiate between a government and the people. And it's the governments that sow hatred, the people have nothing to do with it [...] I believe [Israel] has a very racist government. But with the people, it's different." However, in some interviews only "the policy of the Israeli government" was criticized, while others made all Jews responsible for the actions of the state of Israel.

Asked about the Middle East conflict, interviewees interpreted it as a political conflict over land and resources. An interpretation along ethnic, national, or religious categories was rejected by many of them, like in this statement by a refugee from Syria: "the conflict for me is not a religious conflict. It's the Imams who are inflaming the people and try to turn the political issue into a religious one."

However, for the majority of the interviewees the question of guilt and responsibility was clear and answered in a Manichean way: Israel or its government were portrayed as the perpetrators and aggressors and the Palestinians as victims. The image of the oppressed, resisting Palestinian serves as a figure of identification, sometimes in connection with a common Arab identity. Accordingly, Afghan and Kurdish interviewees employed this mode of identification less so than the Syrians, who have direct contact with Palestinians and their perspective on the conflict in their home country, and identify rather strongly with them.[49] This dualistic, good vs. evil perspective was also observed by volunteer and support staff. An educator who works with refugees noted, "the general thrust was that Israel is the big enemy and supported by the West, and that we are victims. There is a clear separation between perpetrator and victim." Criticism of the Palestinian side of the conflict was rare. If mentioned, it referred to religious radicalization. An interviewee from Iraq criticized the Palestinian side for "inciting the people with extremist ideas like 'Go and kill the Israelis'." This dualistic view, with its clear categorization of victims and perpetrators, influenced the levels of empathy regarding the Middle East conflict. There was little understanding of Jewish perspectives and Jewish histories of persecution. Only one interviewee mentioned discrimination and the expulsion of Jews from Arab lands as important factors for the creation of the State of Israel, and was aware of antisemitism in Iraq.

Like knowledge of Jews and Judaism, knowledge of Israel and the Middle East conflict was something like "common sense," brought with them from the country of origin. The attitudes implied by this knowledge were a matter of course. One Syrian woman said: "as long as I can remember, I know that there is a conflict between Palestinians and Israelis and an occupation. As long as I can remember, I know that Palestine is occupied." An Iraqi expressed something similar: "since I was a child, I knew something about the conflict. I have learned things from my father about it. The issue of Israel and Palestine was also on television a lot." Everyday knowledge is gathered through conversations with family or friends, as well as through the media. Syrians explain the permanent presence

of the conflict via geographical closeness—"one is in the midst of the conflict, so to speak"—as well as through historical factors. These can be positive, like the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs in Damascus, or negative, for instance in statements like: "it's an occupation power, Israel has taken land from Syria and other Arabs as well." This kind of everyday knowledge seemed to be less present in Afghanistan. Another source of knowledge was school where, as mostly Syrian refugees reported, Israel is denounced as the enemy of Arab nationalism. Surprisingly, only three interview partners named religious institutions, mosques, or imams as sources of this knowledge. These three respondents were critical of religion and politics being combined in sermons.

Interestingly, two respondents began to question their ideas about friends and enemies in the wake of their recent experience of war. Here, concrete actors could be pinpointed as responsible for destruction and suffering: Bashar Hafez al-Assad, Russia, Iran, and the Islamic State. This was a clear difference to more common abstractions regarding the Middle East conflict, where Israel is made responsible for "all the evil in the world." One Syrian reflected upon this: "I had one opinion before the war and now another. Before the war, I knew that Israel is the greatest enemy of all Syrians. That is what we were being taught in school, that Israel is the greatest enemy. Now, after the war, I have seen that it is not Israel who is the greatest enemy to Syria, but Iran and Hezbollah." A member of an non-governmental organization (NGO) supporting Syrian dissidents said something similar about his experience of working with Syrian refugees in Berlin: "I have the feeling that there is such a huge catastrophe happening in Syria that few are still focusing on Israel. Whether Gaza is attacked might be troubling to people but it is not as emotional as before. The biggest 'killing machines' right now are Assad and the jihadists." He continued with a remark on the general development of the Arab countries: "the Arab Spring has helped change the thinking on Israel a bit, or at least to not make Israel the main issue, even though that has been the case for decades. 'Why should we talk about Israel if we have such a killer in our country?' [. . .] No one is interested in the Palestinian question,

anymore. There still exists this knowledge that everyone learned at school but I am not sure whether in reality people still believe it."

Some interviews professed a rapprochement between Israel and the Arab countries, that "the countries seem themselves more and more as the friend of Israel," with certain consequences, for instance, on government propaganda.[50] Defying expectations, Israel had intervened in the conflict in Syria, but positively. Some interviewees remember Israeli police taking care of the wounded at the border. In this respect, a change of focus is happening, as one Syrian explains: "in the past, this was the biggest conflict in the region. But now, after everything went wrong in all the countries, everyone is focusing on his own or worries about the news from the war regions, so Israel and the conflict is forgotten." For the interviewees, there are now simply more pressing issues than the Middle East conflict, especially in light of their own recent war experience. However, given the still existing anti-Israel common sense, it is not surprising that "Israel," for many refugees, is a taboo subject in Germany, where they are uncertain about how they should position themselves. Due to their dependence on government agencies, they are afraid "to say something wrong" and put the process of integration in danger through anti-Israel statements.

Knowledge and Opinions about the Holocaust

The interview partners from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan generally have very little knowledge about the Holocaust.[51] What they know is rudimentary and sometimes historically inaccurate. Even though there is some knowledge of the exclusion, expulsion, and ghettoization of Jews, only rarely is the genocide mentioned.[52] An employee at the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe—Berlin's most important Holocaust monument—says of her work with refugees: "the number 'six million' might be known but what has happened exactly, and also the European dimension, is often unknown. The knowledge is very rudimentary." Interestingly, however, she made similar observations regarding German visitors: "this is not different

in the other groups that visit." A lack of knowledge among German students was affirmed in a 2017 study, according to which 41 percent of students aged 14 and older did not know that Auschwitz-Birkenau was a concentration camp.[53] Similarly, knowledge of Adolf Hitler was characterized by de-contextualization: quotations by Hitler circulate on the Internet and he is known as a military leader, but the connection to the Holocaust is rarely mentioned. Many interviewees relativize National Socialism due to a lack of historical knowledge, for instance, in statements like: "Hitler didn't like the Jews and pretty much excluded them from society."

It became obvious that few sources of legitimate information on the Holocaust exist in the countries of origin. Interviewees remarked that schools in Iraq and Syria teach little to nothing about the Holocaust, which was at best a side note to learning about the Second World War.[54] As in the case of the Middle East conflict, knowledge comes from everyday conversations, alongside historical novels, books, and newspapers. Two Syrians who have been living in Germany for a couple of years recalled: "we learned little about Hitler in school. I remember that we were taught that Russia, America, France, and Great Britain wanted to attack Germany and the Germans resisted but eventually lost the Second World War [...] But I can't remember hearing anything about the Holocaust in school [...] After that, we could only get more information in English and French, there was no information in Arabic."

Many refugees spoke of an active search for information after arriving in Germany. In their language classes, they were confronted with visiting the Monument of the Murdered Jews of Europe, they see other monuments when exploring the city and hear everyday conversations about the subject, thus sensing the significance this topic has in today's Germany. Those interviewees who speak English and have a higher level of education watch documentaries and movies about the Holocaust on the Internet.[55] This indicates that many of the newcomers want to understand German history and have a strong desire to integrate into society. Some of the interview partners were interested in the Holocaust not because it is a German event but rather because it has global implications—similar to the

notion of a "cosmopolitan memory."[56] The Holocaust is an event that has universal meaning and needs to be remembered as such: "the whole world, all human beings, own the Holocaust [...] It's something that's happened to the whole of humanity [...] So that it happened [kind] of changed the whole [world]." In other cases, focusing on the Holocaust was viewed with skepticism, drawing on two arguments. First, it was said to be the historical experience of other people: "This is your history, not ours," as one interviewee said. "That was a European problem, not an Iraqi problem," stated another. Second, due to deep-seated anti-Zionism, the historical persecution of Jews as well as the genocide arouses little sympathy. An educator who travelled to Auschwitz with a group of young refugees, a trip he organized with German-Muslim adolescents, reported that the refugees "were a bit confused that we as Muslims were traveling to Auschwitz. It immediately raised the question 'Why? What are you doing there?' [...] The trip was immediately connected to Israel. Instantly the question came up 'Why don't you look at the suffering in Gaza instead of Auschwitz?' The suffering of Jews during the Holocaust is not as important as seeing the Jews as perpetrators in the Middle East conflict [...] This also bordered on conspiracy theories." He concluded that "there is little knowledge on the Holocaust and Shoah but instead a lot of explosive emotions."

Explanations: Regional and Ideological Influences

The sample suggests that there are different influencing factors that can increase or decrease antisemitic attitudes, including everyday knowledge gathered in the country of origin as well as national, ethnic, and religious identities. As indicated, antisemitism was expressed not as a coherent worldview, but in fragments. Most interviewees described this kind of "knowledge" as self-evident, shaped by the media and everyday discourse in their home country. A 2014 survey by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),[57] partly updated in 2015, showed that 74 percent of all respondents in the

MENA region hold between six and 11 of the queried 11 negative stereotypes of Jews to be "probably true." Globally, this number is at 26 percent on average. In the MENA region, 75 percent of respondents say they "hate Jews because of how they behave" and 65 percent think that "Jews are responsible for most of the wars in the world." However, there are no individual studies on the countries of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, making regional generalization difficult. In the interviews, negative images of Jews were described as somehow self-evident, as were perspectives on the Middle East conflict. These perspectives were characterized by homogenous and dualistic ideas in which Israel was always clearly the perpetrator responsible for all negative developments in the region. This everyday hostility toward Israel was also noted by the refugee support workers we interviewed. Influencing factors include not only the media and everyday discourses,[58] but also institutions. Both in school and the public sphere, a negative image of Israel is prevalent. Syria, for instance, has been hostile toward Israel since its creation, and under the leadership of Assad and the Baath party hatred toward Israel and antisemitism directed at Jews in general were disseminated publicly.[59] The same was true under the Saddam Hussein Baathist regime in Iraq.[60] Many who work with refugees note how self-evident these opinions are, but also acknowledge how they lack ideological solidity. They also emphasize the possibility to intervene, as one can question this kind of everyday knowledge. One woman who works as an educator with refugees said, "my experience is the following: if one confronts someone making an antisemitic remark, not much will remain of it [...] This is what they get from the outside and it is very easy to unravel it. It is only a few where there is really something behind it." This means that respondents are able to critically engage influences from their country of origin, rejecting or modifying them when confronted by other views. A recent large-scale quantitative survey in Germany even points to the fact that the refugees arriving have more "tolerant" worldviews with regard to women's rights, homosexuality, or authoritarian leadership compared to the rest of the population in their country of origin. This may point to the fact that a decision

to leave correlates with an above average critical attitude towards hegemonic discourses.[61]

One of the more pronounced findings from our sample is that respondents with an Arab background tend to hold stronger antisemitic attitudes than others. This might indicate Arab nationalism as an influencing factor, hinted at in statements like: "one says that we're all connected as Arabs. Somehow we are all Arabs." The two Syrians who have lived in Germany for some time describe the influence of Arab nationalism on prevalent images of Israel: "Syrians are starting from a nationalist background, from what they learned in school and under Assad in the last 40 years. Israel is the greatest enemy in the world, this is how it is presented." They remembered: "you learn Arab nationalism in school, in the history books. People are still protecting Arab nationalism, because of Islam. Because they think that it is part of being Muslim that you are also being Arab." In Arab nationalism, sometimes "the Jews" are portrayed as the counter-image of "the Arabs," and Israel is demonized.[62] Self-identification as Arab strengthens identification with the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict. This was confirmed by a respondent from Syria: "this is where the solidarity with the Palestinians comes from. Because Syria sees itself as an Arab country and because the Palestinians are Arabs, that's why they have to be in solidarity with them." In the case of the sole interviewee who described herself as Palestinian, this identity and therefore a highly emotional perspective on the Middle East conflict directly determined her antisemitic attitudes.

In contrast, the Afghan respondents from the sample have significantly lower rates of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes than respondents from Syria or Iraq. Even though the Afghan interviewees exhibited a certain closeness to Palestinians and Arabs due to their shared identification as Muslim, they do not themselves identify as Arab. As a result, antisemitic and anti-Zionist arguments mediated by Arab nationalism are not relevant to them. In stark contrast to other interviewees, all three Afghan men interviewed expressed a notably pro-Israeli perspective. One Afghan respondent who lived in Iran for 19 years contrasted the negative media on the

Israel-Palestinian conflict in Iran with his actual experience, leading him to a more positive evaluation: "my information comes from newspapers. Iran is very much against Israel. But fellow countrymen who have lived in Israel have spoken very well about it. The Palestinians are throwing rocks and are very brutal but the Israelis not so much. They only hit back when it's really bad." Another Afghan man says about Jews in Israel: "they have a right to Israel as a state because 70 years ago they bought the land with help of the English [...] I respect the Israelis because they are still fighting." Two of the Afghan interviewees also exhibited an awareness of antisemitic violence and criticized anti-Zionism in Iran. Almost all of them have a history of migration, which led them to live in Iran for nine to 19 years; one of them was born there. Many of the Afghan minority in Iran have experienced exclusion and racism.[63] One of them saw the experience of continuous discrimination, hostility, and even open violence as the basis for his awareness of inequality, because "being born in a region in which you're feeling discrimination every day, makes you realize that politics affect your life. You feel it." One could ask whether this has influenced their rather negative opinion of the Islamic Republic and might also have contributed to questioning the prevalent ideologies in Iran regarding Jews and Israel. Their long transnational experiences of flight and living in many countries allowed them to witness different portrayals of historical and political events. There are indications that those interviewees who had longer stays in different countries during their flight process were confronted with interculturality and contradictions, and are less likely to adopt a closed dogmatic worldview. We conclude that in these cases, experiencing discrimination in the countries of origin and during transit led to the development of empathy, including greater understanding toward Jews.

Among the interviewees were three Kurdish people from Syria who expressed neutral to mildly negative attitudes toward Jews or Israel. One of them started a friendship with a Jewish classmate in her German course: "I don't know much about Judaism because I am still young. But as I am generally interested in religion, I also want to learn about Judaism." All the Kurdish interview partners

were religious but held a rather individualistic understanding of Islam: "it's not primarily about religion but rather about people treating each other respectfully," one said. Regarding the Middle East conflict, all three considered "both sides." One Kurdish woman said: "it bothers me that the conflict is always handled like one would have to decide for one side or the other. But both sides have a right to live, I am simply against war." Another respondent criticized "Zionism," which is used to argue "that Israel should have all of the land," but at the same time said that Israel has a right to exist, adding that the land "should be shared with the Palestinians." Again, their experiences as an oppressed minority living in Syria[64] might be an influencing factor, impeding identification with nationalist narratives and encouraging criticism of hegemonic state policies. Likewise, their lack of identification with Arab nationalism also prevented them from adopting certain antisemitic images. Furthermore, recent political developments in the Kurdish region have led to a change in views on Israel. For instance, Iraqi Kurdistan has strengthened its relationship with Israel in recent years, the media now exhibits less antisemitic propaganda, and it is the only region in the Arab League where Holocaust Remembrance Day is institutionalized.[65] Kurds in Syria and Israel have had good relations at times, even though there are no official pro-Israel declarations.[66] In 2014 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his support for the Kurdish cause.[67] Our observation that Kurdish refugees exhibit less antisemitic attitudes is also confirmed by some refugee support workers.

Two respondents explained their antisemitic or anti-Israel views as the result of their Muslim identity. However, it was not possible in our study to offer a differentiated perspective on the many intra-Muslim currents, which might answer the question of how their respective understanding of religion affects their view of Jews and Israel. Those interview partners who explained their antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes via their Muslim identity generalized the supposition that Muslims and Jews are historical enemies. This is expressed in statements like "because I know the history of the Muslim religion and because I know about Islam, I know that

Jews have caused problems for Muslims [...] I have read that Jews put the prophet in jail, tortured him and said bad things about his mother. They have tortured him with words and also beat him." In this case, the religious "knowledge" about Jews prevents even friendly contacts with Jews. When asked about the possibility of befriending a Jewish person, the Afghan interview partner answered: "I don't see it, because I think that this person could do the same to me." Some refugee aid workers also noted how Muslim refugees deduce a rejection of Jews from the Koran. However, it seems to be less the degree of religiosity than the individual understanding of religion that influences the degree of antisemitic attitudes. Those respondents who see religion as something personal show a higher tolerance toward other beliefs and lifestyles. The same is true for interviewees who articulate a principled critique of religion. This has consequences for their perspective on the historical and religious narratives in their countries of origin as well: "when I began to free myself from religion, I also began questioning Islamic history," one interviewee said. He formulated a fundamental critique of Israel, but as a religious state, a criticism he also extends to Iran: "As a religious state it is unacceptable. Not because it is a Jewish state." In the case of one atheist respondent from Afghanistan-Iran, his criticism of Islam and Muslim states in general led to empathy for Israel. Criticizing Iran's desire to destroy Israel, he said: "If the Muslim countries had as much power [as the National Socialists] they would be worse than Hitler."

Overall, there seems to be a relationship between embracing collective identities (religious, ethnic, national) and generalizing about other social groups. People in the sample who exhibited a rather individualistic understanding of identity tended to have fewer homogenizing perspectives regarding other social groups and fewer explanations based on generalizations.[68] There is, however, no correlation between the level of education a person has and the level of antisemitic attitudes they harbor (for instance, the Afghan interviewee critical of antisemitism had dropped out of school at age 13).

Comparison to the Findings of Other Studies

Many of our findings are similar to those of the aforementioned studies of refugees in Germany. This holds true for the general existence of antisemitic attitudes, including classical antisemitic tropes. Among David Ranan's refugee interview partners, the stereotype of Jews as powerful and rich was mentioned,[69] and Günther Jikeli came across the latter many times.[70] One of the two quantitative studies, carried out by Sonja Haug, included the question whether "Jews have too much influence in the world."[71] More than half of the respondents from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (N=547) agreed with this sentiment, but only five percent of respondents from Eritrea did so. This mirrors our findings that the stereotype of Jewish power and influence is widespread, however there are regional differentiations. While we did not interview any Eritreans, we were able to show differences according to nationality and ethnicity.

Other findings are similar to the results of Jikeli's study, such as the wide array of attitudes towards Jews—from positive to neutral to extremely negative—and the fact that ethno-religious minorities such as Kurds seem to be less biased towards Jews.[72] Some of Jikeli's interview partners, however, uttered their antisemitic statements in a much more open fashion. Possible reasons for this could include the dynamic in a group interview generating less inhibition, or the fact that Jikeli may have been perceived as an American researcher, rather than a German one (he presented himself as coming from Indiana University as well as Potsdam University), thus causing less fear of anticipated links to German state authorities.

A lack of knowledge regarding the Holocaust and National Socialism also was clear in Jikeli's study.[73] Ranan shows some responses pointing to a lack of knowledge regarding the Middle East conflict among Muslim refugees as well as other Muslim respondents.[74] Both of these knowledge deficiencies became clear in our interviews.

Differences can be found in the existing empirical studies regarding the amount of contact refugees have with Jews. In our

interviews, several respondents knew about the long history of Jews in Arab countries, some even pointing to persecution or expulsion from these lands. As described above, almost half were in touch with Jews in their everyday life, some of them even actively seeking out contact. Descriptions and memories of contact in their home countries were rather concrete. In Jikeli's study, a few participants reported being or having been in touch with Jews, according to the author there were indicators that these statements, however, may not be true.[75] In our interviews, no indicators pointed to this.

The quantitative study "Refugees 2016" used a written survey to analyze ideas about democracy and integration among inhabitants of two Berlin refugee centers (N=445). It addressed antisemitism with the following question: "if a Jewish family from Israel moved into your next-door apartment, would it be good, irrelevant, or not good?" Of the respondents, 14 percent answered "not good," 26 percent "good," and 60 percent said "irrelevant."[76] Approval rates were lower than in the case of a "German family with many children" or an "African family" moving in next door. This question cannot clearly distinguish whether the negative result is due to the family's ethno-religious identity or whether their nationality as *Israeli* Jews plays a role, but it does point to the fact that contact with Jews seems to be less desirable than with other national groups. While it is a noticeable difference that in our survey contact with Jews is seen generally as neutral and sometimes positive by respondents, a comparison of these findings is not possible as we did not ask this specific question or address anticipated contact with other national groups.

Another difference in our study is that conspiratorial ideologies were not mentioned explicitly, unlike in the findings of Jikeli for example, where interview partners quoted from *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, said the Mossad, Freemasons, or "International Zionism" was responsible for ISIS, and the Jewish or Israel Lobby was controlling the United States. According to Jikeli, "a view of the world and history that is downright structured by fantasies of conspiracies shows up in almost all interviews in a number of subjects."[77] One reason for this difference could be that Jikeli

explicitly asked respondents who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. However, some of the conspiratorial ideologies were mentioned in other contexts of his interviews as well.

Another relevant difference concerns the role of Islam. While in Jikeli's interviews, much like in our own, Jew-hatred is only rarely explained through explicit religious reasoning, there are many interviewees of his who reproduce stereotypes grounded in Islamic antisemitism: the idea that "the Jews" forged the Holy Scriptures, tried to kill the prophet Mohammed, or familiarity with the idea that Jews are descendants of apes or pigs.[78] Differences are hard to explain and may simply be a matter of coincidence in the choice of interview partners in these two non-representative samples. The notion that Jews and Muslims are general enemies, however, is present in both sets of interviews. Berek's interview partners "regarded Arab nationalism rather than Islam as the source of antisemitic attitudes, with, for instance, Arab Christians showing stronger antisemitic attitudes than Moroccan Muslims."[79] Yet Berek only talked to experts, which makes a direct comparison difficult. In Ranan's interviews, none of the Muslim interview partners—and this includes refugees—named the Koran as a source for hatred of Jews and Israel.[80]

To conclude, a comprehensive comparison of existing studies proves difficult due to differences in methodology and in interview subjects. The existing empirical literature points to some similarities as well as to differences in both the nature of expression and sources of antisemitism among refugees in Germany. It becomes clear that further surveys, particularly quantitative ones, are needed to understand current developments.

Antisemitic Attitudes in Context: Analytical Consequences

Apart from its findings regarding refugee attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Holocaust, the results of our study shed light on various questions regarding antisemitism in diverse societies in general, and the German migration society in particular.

First, we make clear that, contrary to many reports in the media, refugees are not a single homogenous group. Even though antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are exhibited by many respondents, their perspectives on Jews, the Holocaust, and Israel are diverse—as is also the case in the general German population.

Second, our study engages the debate regarding the specific nature of "Muslim antisemitism." While it points to some references to Islamic sources of Jew-hatred, it does not show a causal relationship between Muslim religious identity and antisemitism. Visible, however, are the effects of homogenizing collective identity constructions like Arab nationalism that by extension label Jews as an "outgroup."[81]

Third, the study points to the necessity of examining historical and social contexts when analyzing antisemitic statements. This can be illustrated by the example of drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of National Socialism. Surveys in Germany reveal that this equation should be understood as a clear indication of antisemitism (against Israel).[82] Internationally, it also counts as one of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the state of Israel, as it is used in research and educational practices based on the "Working Definition of Antisemitism" developed by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC; later the Fundamental Rights Agency) and adopted in 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).[83] It is necessary, however, to emphasize a seemingly secondary remark in the "Working Definition" which demands "taking into account the overall context." In our sample, many interviewees agree to the statement: "what the state of Israel does to the Palestinians today is the same as what the Nazis did to the Jews in the Third Reich." What should be obvious though, especially in the context of a lack of knowledge about the Holocaust, is that this is not a historically informed comparison with the (explicit or implicit) goal of relativizing the Holocaust. Considering the overall context—the regional background of the respondent, quality of education, and media discourse—the Holocaust rather

becomes an abstract symbol, a symbol for suffering, injustice, and criminality. It is used to describe the Middle East conflict as well as other political situations in scandalizing terms to communicate outrage and frustration. This explains why the Holocaust can be used as a template for the Syrian Civil War, for instance, in a statement by a respondent who lived in a city on the outskirts of Damascus: "I think that the situation of the Palestinians is not as bad as in the Holocaust. Only what happens in Syria right now could be worse than the Holocaust, because it is taking such a long time and so many people have died." Social media platforms like Facebook provide another example of this, where at times the hashtag #AleppoHolocaust was used.[84] An analysis that takes context into account requires the examination of statements regarding their intention and reception, as well as national and historical experiences. These contexts should not be understood as deterministic but as biographical imprints, requiring more knowledge about the discourse found in the countries of origin—especially in order to formulate effective counter-strategies.

Fourth, against the backdrop of heterogeneous attitudes, and read in comparison with pre-existing research, our study results emphasize that one cannot assume that refugees from Muslim-Arab lands hold the same attitudes as people with a Muslim migration background. Instead of supporting culturalizing generalizations in which antisemitic attitudes among refugees are understood to be extensions of those held by Muslims and Arabs in Germany, as is sometimes observed in media coverage, it is necessary to understand the differences between German Muslims and refugees. One of the central experiences for Muslims and Arabs in Germany is anti-Muslim discrimination.[85] The effects of racism affects "the Other" on the inside, for example, by excluding second or third generation Arab migrants even though they hold German citizenship and were born and raised in the country. This experience of exclusion can lead to self-ethnicization and the stressing of other identity markers like "Muslim," "Arab," and "Palestinian."[86] The exclusionary effects are different for the "Others" who are refugees,

newcomers mediated by the pressures of integration and an uncertain legal status. The antisemitic statements of the former group can be a means of provocation, reacting to their experience of exclusion by flagrantly breaking a German taboo. In other words, for many of those born in Germany, "Palestine" is mostly a projection screen.[87] Many recent refugees, however, have had real experiences in the region, which contrasts with these projections and influences their perspective of Israel. Some tend to be more cautious regarding provocative statements due to their legally precarious status. These different experiences of discrimination thus have concrete effects on the expression of antisemitic resentment, and must be analyzed accordingly.

No direct correlation can be posited between subjective experiences of discrimination and antisemitic attitudes however. For some interview partners, experiencing discrimination and exclusion in their countries of origin and during transit (for instance, Afghan refugees in Iran or Kurds in Syria) resulted in them criticizing prejudice against others as well, or feeling empathy for others. Yet this cannot be said for everyone in a similar situation. This ambivalence mirrors findings from social psychology research, where the role played by distressing personal experience in the development of empathy is contested. While some studies support the idea that personal experience generates empathy,[88] there are others that conclude the exact opposite.[89] This is also dependent on how "empathy" is perceived.

In her analysis of Holocaust education programs for young Muslims in Germany, Esra Özyürek notes that empathy toward Jewish victims of the Holocaust is always socially and historically situated—it can incorporate personal experiences of exclusion and victimhood as Muslims, but it can also find expression in forms of rivalry, envy, or "victimhood competition."[90] Despite the fact that, thus far, no direct correlation appears to exist between the experience of discrimination and the production of antisemitic attitudes, racism does have a deeply corrosive effect on people's lives and therefore should be considered when analyzing antisemitism in contemporary migration societies.[91]

Notes

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2. Erika Steinbach (@SteinbachErika), "Innerhalb eines Jahres haben wir mehr als eine Million Antisemiten zusätzlich in D," *Twitter* (November 25, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://twitter.com/SteinbachErika/status/802212279945142272?lang=de.

3. Sabine Hess et al., *Der lange Sommer der Migration: Grenzregime III* (Berlin: Assoziation A, 2016).

4. Between summer 2015 and summer 2017, about 1.2 million refugees came to Germany, more than ever before in a comparable period of the country's history. See Bundesministerium des Innern, "90.389 Asylsuchende im ersten Halbjahr 2017," July 7, 2017, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/07/asylantraege-juni-2017.html, 8; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, "Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2016," accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/bundesamt-in-zahlen-2016.html?nn=9121126; Bundesministerium des Innern, "890.000 Asylsuchende im Jahr 2015," September 30, 2016, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/09/asylsuchende-2015.html.

5. See "Proteste gegen und Übergriffe auf Flüchtlingsunterkünfte im vierten Quartal 2016. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Frank Tempel, Jan van Aken, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Drucksache 18/11298," *Deutscher Bundestag*, February 22, 2017, accessed January 29, 2018, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/112/1811298.pdf, 8 ff.; Bundesministerium des Innern, "Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2015. Bundesweite Fallzahlen," published May 23, 2016, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/05/pks-und-pmk-2015.html, 6.

6. *Deutscher Bundestag*, "Proteste," 50 ff.

7. For the years 2014 to 2016, see Elmar Brähler, Oliver Decker, and Johannes Kiess, eds., *Die enthemmte Mitte. Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland* (Leipzig: Psychosozial Verlag, 2016), 35;

Elmar Brähler, Oliver Decker, and Johannes Kiess, eds., *Die stabilisierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland* (University of Leipzig, 2014), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/14490/Mitte_Leipzig_Internet.pdf, 35; Anna Klein and Andreas Zick, *Fragile Mitte—Feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland* (Bonn: Dietz, 2014), 73, 80.

8. "Third Survey of European Jewish Leaders and Opinion Formers, 2015," *JDC International Center for Community Development* (March 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=2711, 32f.

9. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Antisemitism Summary Overview of the Data Available in the European Union 2003—2013," (October 2014), accessed January 29, 2018, http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/antisemitism-summary-overview-situation-european-union-2003-2013, 4.

10. For an analysis of the current situation in France, see Günther Jikeli, "Antisemitic Acts and Attitudes in Contemporary France: The Effects on French Jews," *Antisemitism Studies* 2.2 (Fall 2018), 297–320.

11. Andreas Zick et al., "Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Ein Studienbericht für den Expertenrat Antisemitismus," (April 2017), accessed January 29, 2018, https://uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/daten/JuPe_Bericht_April2017.pdf, 13.

12. Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yitzhak Sternberg, and Olaf Glöckner, eds., "Juden und jüdische Bildung im heutigen Deutschland," (October 2010), accessed January 29, 2018, http://archive.jpr.org.uk/download?id=2652, 45.

13. Zick et al., "Jüdische Perspektiven," 15, 36.

14. Ibid., 68ff.

15. Michael Brenner, "Bringen die Flüchtlinge mehr Antisemitismus nach Deutschland?," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (September 20, 2015), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/2.220/debatte-bringen-die-fluechtlinge-mehr-antisemitismus-nach-deutschland-1.2655933.

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January 29, 2018, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/juden-in-berlin-sorge-vor-neuem-antisemitismus-wegen-fluechtlingen/12455444.html.

18. See for instance, "Importierter Antisemitismus: Wie sicher fühlen sich Juden in Deutschland?," *ARD-Mittagsmagazin* (January 26, 2016), accessed October 15, 2016, video, http://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/mittagsmagazin/videos/antisemitismus-in-deutschland-100.html; Jan Fleischhauer, "Importierter Judenhass," *Spiegel Online* (December 1, 2015), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-und-antisemitismus-importierter-judenhass-kolumne-a-1065390-druck.html.

19. See an overview of media articles in Sina Arnold and Jana König, "Flucht und Antisemitismus. Erste Hinweise zu Erscheinungsformen von Antisemitismus bei Geflüchteten und mögliche Umgangsstrategien. Qualitative Befragung von Expert_innen und Geflüchteten," (Humboldt University of Berlin, December 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.bim.hu-berlin.de/media/Abschlussbericht_Flucht_und_Antisemitismus_SA_JK.pdf.

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25. See Philip Kuhn and Noemi Mihalovici, "Hast du schon mal einen Juden gesehen?," *Die Welt* (January 25, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151428527/Hast-du-schon-mal-einen-Juden-gesehen.html.

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27. For an overview, see the collection of recent research projects on forced migration: "Flucht: Forschung und Transfer. Flüchtlingsforschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies and Bonn International Center for Conversion, accessed January 29, 2018, https://flucht-forschung-transfer.de/.

28. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), the Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) of the Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) and the Forschungszentrum Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF-FZ)—a representative face-to-face survey of 2,000 adult refugees living in Germany since 2013. These surveys focus mostly on the different aspects of refugee living situations in Germany.

29. A research overview is offered by Günther Jikeli, "Antisemitic Attitudes Among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review," *ISGAP Occasional Paper Series*, no. 1 (May 2015). For further studies, see Michaela Glaser and Sally Hohnstein, "Ethnozentrismus und Antisemitismus in Migrationskontexten—ein Überblick über den Forschungsstand," in *Ethnozentrismus und Antisemitismus bei Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund*, Frank Greuel and Michaela Glaser, eds., (Halle: Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2012), 10–25; Wolfgang Frindte et al., "Lebenswelten junger Muslime in Deutschland," (November 2011), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Institute/Sozialwissenschaften/BF/Lehre/SoSe_2015/Islam/Lebenswelten_junger_Muslime.pdf, 227–247; Katrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, "Muslime in Deutschland: Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt," (December 2007), accessed January 29, 2018, https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/handle/10900/63010, 279ff; "Europe's Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view each other," *Pew Global Attitudes Project* (June 2006), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/253.pdf; Günther Jikeli, "Antisemitismus unter Muslimen—Debatten, Umfragen, Einflussfaktoren," in *Gebildeter Antisemitismus*, Monika Schwarz-Friesel, ed., (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 187–216.

30. See Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess and Elmar Brähler, *Die Mitte im Umbruch. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland* (Bonn: Dietz, 2012), 78 ,79.

31. Jürgen Mansel and Viktoria Spaiser, *Ausgrenzungsdynamiken. In welchen Lebenslagen Jugendliche Fremdgruppen abwerten* (Weinheim: Beltz, 2013).

32. Günther Jikeli, *European Muslim Antisemitism. Why Young Urban Males Say They Don't Like Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).

33. For instance, see Barbara Schäuble, *Anders als wir: Differenzkonstruktionen und Alltagsantisemitismus unter Jugendlichen* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012); Sina Arnold and Günther Jikeli, "Judenhass und Gruppendruck—Zwölf Gespräche mit jungen Berlinern palästinensischen und libanesischen Hintergrunds," in *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 17, Wolfgang Benz, ed., (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2008), 105–130.

34. Hochschule für Medien, Kommunikation und Wirtschaft (HMKW), Flüchtlinge 2016. Studie der HMKW zu Demokratieverständnis und Integrationsbereitschaft von Flüchtlingen *2016,* (August 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.hmkw.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/pdfs/Publikationen/HMKW_Fl%C3%BCchtlinge_2016_Studie_Ronald_Freytag_20160815.pdf; Sonja Haug et al., Asylsuchende in Bayern. Eine quantitative und qualitative Studie, (Regensburg: Hans Seidel Stiftung, 2017).

35. Günther Jikeli, *Einstellungen von Geflüchteten aus Syrien und dem Irak zu Integration, Identität, Juden und Shoah* (December 2017), accessed January 29, 2018, https://ajcberlin.org/sites/default/files/ajc_studie_gefluechtete_und_antisemitismus_2017.pdf.

36. David Ranan, *Muslimischer Antisemitismus. Eine Gefahr für den gesellschaftlichen Frieden in Deutschland?* (Bonn: Dietz, 2018). The number of refugees interviewed is not mentioned.

37. Ibid., 199f. The conclusions that Ranan draws from these observations, including the claim that verbal hatred against Jews is often merely a form of misdirected resentment against Israel, are debatable. Since his refugee subsample consists of very few individuals, this study will not be used for further analysis and comparison.

38. David Feldman, *Antisemitismus und Immigration im heutigen Westeuropa. Gibt es einen Zusammenhang? Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen einer Studie aus fünf Ländern* (April 2018), accessed July 26, 2018,

http://www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk/assets/Uploads/BBK-J5998-Pears-Institute-Reports-GERMAN-FINAL-REPORT-180410-WEB.pdf.

39. Mathias Berek, *Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today. Is There A connection? The Case of Germany* (April 2018), accessed July 26, 2018, http://www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk/assets/Uploads/BBK-J5998-Pears-Institute-Reports-GERMANY-COUNTRY-REPORT-180427.pdf.

40. The study was conducted in 2016 at the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM) of the Humboldt University of Berlin. It was included in the antisemitism report of the German Bundestag authored by an independent group of experts on antisemitism (Sina Arnold and Jana König, "Flucht und Antisemitismus.")

41. One married couple wished to be interviewed jointly. All names of the interviewees were changed.

42. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, "Aktuelle Zahlen zu Asyl," (August 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-august-2016.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, 10.

43. All of the following quotations are taken from the empirical study.

44. This holds true for studying antisemitism and other forms of prejudice in other population groups as well. On the challenges of gathering data from refugees, see Sonja Haug, Susanne Lochner, and Dominik Huber, "Methodische Herausforderungen der quantitativen und qualitativen Datenerhebung bei Geflüchteten," *Verhandlungen des 38. Kongresses der deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie* 38 (2017), accessed January 29, 2018, http://publikationen.soziologie.de/index.php/kongressband_2016/article/view/402/pdf_107.

45. Naika Foroutan et al., Zwischen Lager und Mietvertrag—Wohnunterbringung geflüchteter Frauen in Berlin und Dresden," accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.bim-fluchtcluster.hu-berlin.de/de/9-zwischen-lager-und-mietvertrag/forschungsbericht. These findings are in accordance with a study for UNICEF by the Bundesfachverband für Unbegleitete Minderjährige Flüchtlinge e.V. (National Association for Unaccompanied Minors), which stresses the poor living conditions in refugee shelters particularly for children and youngsters. See Mirjam Lewek and Adam Naber, "Kindheit im Wartezustand. Studie zur Situation von Kindern und Jugendlichen in Flüchtlingsunterkünften in Deutschland," accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.unicef.de/blob/137704/053

ab16048c3f443736c4047694cc5d1/studie--kindheit-im-wartezustand-data.pdf. See also Meryam Schouler-Ocak and Christine Kurmeyer, "Study on Female Refugees. Repräsentative Untersuchung von geflüchteten Frauen in unterschiedlichen Bundesländern in Deutschland," accessed January 29, 2018, http://docplayer.org/50274892-Abschlussbericht-repraesentative-untersuchung-von-gefluechteten-frauen-in-unterschiedlichen-bundeslaendern-in-deutschland.html.

46. Friedrich Burschel, "Verlorene Landstriche. Herausforderungen in den 'Entleerungsräumen': rechter Mainstream und rechtsextreme Verankerung in der Provinz," in *Stadt—Land—Rechts. Brauner Alltag in der deutschen Provinz*, ed. Friedrich Burschel (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2010), 10–21.

47. For 2015, the Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution estimates that 7,900 Salafists are living in Germany. Only in rare cases are they reported to issue calls for "refugee support" ("Verfassungsschutzbericht 2015," Bundesministerium des Innern, accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2015.pdf, 174ff.).

48. However, this stereotype was explicitly mentioned as such by the interviewers.

49. In Syria, a country of about 22 million inhabitants, around 529,000 Palestinian refugees and their descendants were recorded as residents in 2011, See "Syrien," Auswärtiges Amt, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes_Uebersichtsseiten/Syrien_node.html.

50. For more on these changes, see Udi Dekel, Nir Boms, and Ofir Winter, "Syria's New Map and New Actors: Challenges and Opportunities for Israel," *Institute for National Security Studies*, Memorandum no. 156 (August 2016).

51. For an extensive analysis of the Holocaust and memory discourses, see Sina Arnold and Jana König, "The Whole World Owns the Holocaust"—Erinnerungspolitik in der postmigrantischen Gesellschaft," in Naika Foroutan, Juliane Karakayali, Juliane, Riem Spielhaus, *Postmigrantische Perspektiven* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2018).

52. For an international perspective, see Günther Jikeli, Kim Robin Stoller, and Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun, eds., *Umstrittene Geschichte. Ansichten zum Holocaust unter Muslimen im internationalen Vergleich* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2013); Gilbert Achar, *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives* (London: Saqi Books, 2010).

53. See "Geschichtsunterricht", *Forsa*, accessed Janaury 29, 2018, https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/handlungsfeld_internationale-verstaendigung/pdf/2017/Ergebnisse_forsa-Umfrage_Geschichtsunterricht_Koerber-Stiftung.pdf. This mirrors results from other countries such as the United States, where a recent study found significant gaps in knowledge about the Holocaust: 11 percent of US adults and 22 percent of millennials have not heard or are not sure if they have heard of the Holocaust; 31 percent of all Americans and 41 percent of millennials believe that substantially less than six million Jews were killed. See "The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, The Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness Study," (2018), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/images/holocaustknowledgestudy.pdf, 2.

54. See Renate Heugel, *Die deutsch-arabische Freundschaft. Deutsche Geschichte (1815–1945) in syrischen Schulbücher*, (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac Verlag, 2013).

55. The confrontation with a previously unknown historical event might explain why many interviewees are insecure or reluctant vis-a-vis their own knowledge ("From what I've heard" / "I am not sure this is true. That's why I'd rather say nothing").

56. Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, *Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter. Der Holocaust* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), 56ff.

57. See "ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism," *Anti-Defamation League*, accessed January 29, 2018, http://global100.adl.org/.

58. See for instance, the documentation of the report *Iraq Needs Hitler* from the Iraqi daily newspaper *Al-Zaman* by MEMRI: "Article In Iraqi Newspaper: Iraq Needs A Hitler To Stop The Jews Who Are Planning A Takeover Of Iraq," MEMRI, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/51/9063.htm; see also, "New Arab Antisemitic TV Series: Jews Of Khaybar Instigate War Between Arab Tribes," MEMRI, accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7268.htm; and Joel Kotek, *Cartoons and Extremism: Israel and the Jews in Arab and Western Media* (Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008).

59. "Matza von Zion," an often republished book by the former defense minister of Syria, Mustafa Tlas, in which ritual murder figures prominently, is just one example. On contemporary antisemitism in Syria, see Jeffrey Herf, "Was wird aus dem Judenhass der Flüchtlinge?", *Die Welt*

(December 14, 2015), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article149944120/Was-wird-aus-dem-Judenhass-der-Fluechtlinge.html.

60. See Amatzia Baram, "Irak," in *Handbuch des Antisemitismus. Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Länder und Regionen*, Wolfgang Benz, ed., (Munich: De Gruyter, 2008), 150–154. There are no extensive studies on anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Afghanistan.

61. See Herbert Brücker, Nina Rother and Jürgen Schupp, *IAB-Forschungsbericht 14/2016, IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Überblick und erste Ergebnisse*, accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb29-iab-bamf-soep-befragung-gefluechtete.pdf.

Moreover, a study from October 2015 demonstrated fear for one's life and the violence of the Assad regime as reasons for flight. See "Fluchtgründe und Zukunftsperspektiven—Rückkehr nach Syrien? Erste umfangreiche Befragung von geflohenen SyrerInnen in Deutschland. Bundespressekonferenz," *Adopt a Revolution* (October 7, 2015), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.adoptrevolution.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pressemappe-adopt-a-revolution-fluchtumfrage.pdf.

62. See Yigal Carmon, "Was ist arabischer Antisemitismus?," in *Neu-alter Judenhass. Antisemitismus, arabisch-israelischer Konflikt und europäische Politik*, eds., Klaus Faber, Julius Schoeps, and Sacha Stawski (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2006), 203–210; Jochen Müller, "Ventil und Kitt—Die Funktion von Israel und 'den Juden' in der Ideologie des Arabischen Nationalismus," in *Israel in deutschen Wohnzimmern. Realität und antisemitische Wahrnehmungsmuster des Nahostkonflikts*, ed. Initiative Antisemitismuskritik Hannover (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2005), 44–69.

63. For an overview of the situation of the Afghan minority in Iran, see Fariba Adelkhah and Zuzanna Olszewska, "The Iranian Afghans," *Iranian Studies* 40.2 (April 2007): 137–165; and, Sune Engel Rasmussen and Zahra Nader, "Iran Covertly Recruits Afghan Shias to Fight in Syria," *The Guardian* (June 30, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran-covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria.

64. One Kurdish interviewee remarked: "For years we are marching for our rights as Kurds, we feel like second class citizens in our home country."

65. See for instance, Joseph Croitoru, "Die Landkarte des Nahen Ostens verändern," *FAZ* (August 27, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018,

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/israelisch-kurdische-beziehungen-13116886.html; and, Thomas Von Der Osten-Sacken, "Wunderbare Freundschaft. Die Autonome Region Kurdistan sucht Nähe zu Israel," *Jüdische Allgemeine* (June 9, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/25763.

66. See for instance, Dov Lieber, "After Declaring Autonomy, Syrian Kurds 'Open to Ties with Israel'," *The Times of Israel* (March 18, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.timesofisrael.com/after-declaring-autonomy-will-israel-embrace-syrias-kurds/; and, Ofra Bengio, "Israel and the Kurds: Love by Proxy," *The American Interest* (March 18, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/18/israel-and-the-kurds-love-by-proxy/.

67. See "Israel's Prime Minister Backs Kurdish Independence," *The Guardian* (June 29, 2014), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/israel-prime-minister-kurdish-independence.

68. This is the also the conclusion of Günther Jikeli in *Antisemitismus und Diskriminierungswahrnehmungen junger Muslime in Europa: Ergebnisse einer Studie unter jungen muslimischen Männern* (Essen: Klartext-Verlagsges, 2012), 314–316.

69. Ranan, *Muslimischer Antisemitismus*, 200.

70. Jikeli, *Einstellungen von Geflüchteten*, 30f.

71. Haug et al., *Asylsuchende in Bayern*, 68f.

72. Jikeli, *Einstellungen von Geflüchteten*, 8f.

73. Ibid., 38.

74. Ranan, *Muslimischer Antisemitismus*, 175ff.

75. Jikeli, *Einstellungen von Geflüchteten*, 19f.

76. Hochschule für Medien, Kommunikation und Wirtschaft (HMKW), Flüchtlinge 2016, 13.

77. Ibid., 8, author's translation.

78. Ibid., 20f.

79. Berek, *Antisemitism and Immigration,* 83.

80. Ranan, *Muslimischer Antisemitismus*, 113.

81. Likewise, Claudia Dantschke stresses the importance of collective identities in the context of acquiring antisemitic sentiments in Muslim environments. However, the binary distinction of "us" vs. "the others" can be made on the basis of religion as well as on politics, ideology or nationalism. See Claudia Dantschke, "Feindbild Juden. Zur Funktionalität

der antisemitischen Gemeinschaftsideologie in muslimisch geprägten Milieus," in *Konstellationen des Antisemitismus. Antisemitismusforschung und sozialpädagogische Praxis*, eds. Wolfgang Stender, Guido Follert, and Mihri Özdogan (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 139–146.

82. See Zick et al., "Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland," 19–20.

83. "IHRA Working Definition", accessed October 22, 2018, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/press_release_document_antisemitism.pdf. In September 2017, the IHRA definition of antisemitism was officially adopted by the German government.

84. See Erin WG (@erin_wg3), "@SpeakerRyan @GOP America needs to take action. Regardless of politics, children are suffering. This is not ok. #aleppoholocaust," *Twitter* (January 24, 2017), accessed January 29, 2018, https://twitter.com/erin_wg3/status/824015445875425286; N.ksa (@2007nksa), "The diplomacy of words in UN doesn't solve the problem or end the catastrophe in #Aleppo. We need real actions.#AleppoHolocaust #SaveAleppo," *Twitter* (December 31, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://twitter.com/2007nksa/status/815128398649585665; "#Aleppo Holocaust2- Thousands of innocent human beings were killed, ejected from their homes, destroyed their lands, raped their women," *Facebook* (December 16, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/aalagarni/posts/983479208424468; or Ahmed Salah Eldein, "#aleppoholocaust #syrianlivesmatter The world should move fast to save those dying souls," *Facebook* (December 17, 2016), accessed January 29, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/ASalahEldein/posts/752295191590304.

85. On anti-Muslim racism, see the study, Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, and Elmar Brähler, "Die stabilisierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014" (University of Leipzig, 2014). According to the study, 36.6 percent of Germans agree with the statement "Muslims should be banned from immigration into Germany." The number rose from 22.6 percent in 2012 (Wilhelm Heitmeyer, *Deutsche Zustände: Folge 10* [Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2012]).

86. Fatima El-Tayeb, *Undeutsch: Die Konstruktion des Anderen in der postmigrantischen Gesellschaft* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2016); Kemal Bozay, *"…ich bin stolz, Türke zu sein!" Ethnisierung gesellschaftlicher Konflikte im Zeichen der Globalisierung* (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, 2005).

87. See the study results by Götz Nordbruch, '*Dreaming of a Free Palestine': Muslim Youth in Germany and the Israel-Palestine Conflict* (May 2009), accessed January 29, 2018, https://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Centre/C_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Nyheder/2009/090505GN.pdf, 12.

88. Sara D. Hodges et al., "Giving Birth to Empathy: The Effects of Similar Experience on Empathic Accuracy, Empathic Concern, and Perceived Empathy," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 36 (2010), 398–409; George Loewenstein and Deborah A. Small, "The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The Vicissitudes of Human Sympathy and Caring," *Review of General Psychology* 11 (2007), 112–126; Krystina A. Finlay and Walter G. Stephan, "Improving Intergroup Relations: The Effects of Empathy on Racial Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 30.8 (2006), 1720–1737.

89. Rachel L. Ruttan, Mary-Hunter McDonnell, and Loran F. Nordgren, "Having 'Been There' Doesn't Mean I Care: When Prior Experience Reduces Compassion For Emotional Distress," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 108.4 (2015), 610–622.

90. Esra Özyürek, "Rethinking Empathy: Emotions Triggered by the Holocaust Among the Muslim-Minority in Germany," *Anthropological Theory* 18.4 (2018): 456–477.

91. See Sina Arnold, "Which Side Are You On? Zum schwierigen Verhältnis von Antisemitismus und Rassismus in der Migrationsgesellschaft," in *Das Phantom 'Rasse': Zur Geschichte und Wirkungsmacht von Rassismus*, eds. Naika Foroutan, Christian Geulen, Susanne Illmer, Klaus Vogel and Susanne Wernsing (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag), 189–201.

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