

## **Versailles 1919: the Redefining of German Nationalism**

### **Critical analysis of its effect on popular nationalism**

Of course, Versailles did not create German nationalism. Instead it solidified it. Germany already had a lot of competing nationalist traditions (e.g. imperial, liberal, conservative, socialist etc.) and they were often at war with each other. What Versailles did was to concentrate those traditions around a single, emotionally powerful point - the victim experience of a humiliating imposed peace, and the supposedly morally wrong treaty. In practical terms, Versailles became a kind of national language school by teaching millions of Germans a new set of political language, such as how to talk about the nation (Schmach, Diktat), how to explain misfortune (reparations, “war guilt”), and how to draw boundaries between “real Germans” and alleged internal enemies. That shift mattered because it made nationalism not the position of a political party but common basic belief.<sup>1</sup>

### **1. Nationalism Before 1919: diverse forms of nationalism**

To see the change we should look at how German nationalism was before Versailles. Even in the middle of the First World War, “the nation” could justify opposing programs. In a 1917 Reichstag speech, SPD leader Philipp Scheidemann argued for a negotiated peace without annexations explicitly pushing back against the expansionist goals of the Pan-German League and the idea of a “Siegfrieden” (peace through victory).<sup>2</sup> That was nationalism in a pre-Versailles: focusing on power and status, yet still politically negotiable, with various positions about what exactly should nationalism actually be.

Helmut Walser Smith’s broader point about nationalism helps here: modern nationalism draws strength from large cultural systems such as maps, shared language, and historical symbols rather than only from political doctrines.<sup>3</sup> In 1914–18, those cultural systems were already mobilized. But Versailles would redirect them away from a confident, future oriented, imperial horizon and toward a politics of victimhood, backward regret and moral accounting.

### **2. Versailles as a turning point: defeat vs ‘Diktat’**

Two aspects of the treaty were especially effective in reshaping popular nationalism. First was the way the treaty was signed. Germany as the defeated party, receiving terms and having limited space to negotiate. Second was the way key clauses were understood inside Germany. The most famous example is Article 231, where Germany accepts responsibility for the loss and damage caused by the war “imposed ... by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”<sup>4</sup> The clause is part of the reparations section, and was designed to establish legal liability, not to write a full moral history of 1914.<sup>5</sup> But German politics and public debate quickly treated it as a forced confession of national guilt.

Margaret MacMillan describes the immediate reaction in Germany: Germans across the political spectrum had feared a public accusation of responsibility. When the peace terms arrived, many felt those fears confirmed. German negotiators attacked Article 231 mostly out of a sense of honor, turning the issue from technical liability into a national insult.<sup>6</sup> This is powerful and uniting because honor doesn’t belong to a certain group. It invites everyone in, because you don’t need to agree on economics or the constitutional issues to agree that the nation has been dishonored.

### **3. How Versailles unified Germans: a shared language of shame and betrayal**

Nationalism becomes politically potent when it offers a *shared vocabulary* that crosses social boundaries. In June 1919, the signing of the treaty generated visible, collective actions of sorrow: flags at half-pole, public grief, and the sense of a national day of humiliation. MacMillan notes that “even good socialists” now spoke of a “peace of shame.”<sup>7</sup> This is crucial. It shows that Versailles could bridge the left-right divide. The treaty supplied a language (“shame,” “abandonment,” “betrayal”) that made national emotion politically usable even for groups that had previously been suspicious of nationalist rhetoric.

The same mechanism worked through the *Dolchstoß* (stab-in-the-back) claim. The shameful defeat was imagined not as a military or strategic outcome, but as a moral drama in which “traitors at home” and weak politicians had surrendered a nation that had not truly been beaten.<sup>8</sup> Nationalism here is not just love of nation, but a demand for internal discipline and unity, enforced through blame. It creates a ‘we’ by inventing a ‘they’ within the nation.

### **4. How Versailles radicalized nationalism: from grievance to an all-purpose explanation**

Versailles also made nationalism harsher by turning it into a general explanation for everyday hardship. In the early 1920s, Germans confronted inflation, unemployment, and social dislocation. In that climate, “Versailles” became a shortcut diagnosis. MacMillan notes how the treaty was blamed for the economy and the “Diktat” was said to have made recovery impossible. The complaints about the treaty spilled into broader anger at the postwar order.<sup>9</sup>

This mattered because it shifted nationalism from an occasional burst (elections, anniversaries, crises) into something closer to an everyday activity. If your rent rises or your savings disappear, and the public story says “Versailles did this,” then nationalist resentment becomes a practical way of understanding your own life. And once nationalism sits at that everyday level, it becomes easier to radicalize. All compromise starts to look like betrayal, and democratic bargaining looks like weakness.

The radicalizing potential was amplified by institutional effort. MacMillan notes that the German Foreign Office created a dedicated “war guilt” section that produced studies aimed at challenging the legal and historical basis of Versailles.<sup>10</sup> So this revisionism was not only street politics. It was also bureaucratic and scholarly work, feeding into newspapers, pamphlets, and public debate. Once the ‘guilt’ narrative took hold, nationalism shifted from demanding respect to demanding vindication.

### **5. Nationalism before vs. after: what actually changed?**

In a way, Versailles helped turn German nationalism from a project (looking forward) to a wound (looking backwards). Before 1919, nationalist polities could plausibly argue about the future war aims, colonies, constitutional reform, and social policy and so on, while still claiming to speak for the nation. After 1919, the treaty acted like a magnet, and it pulled a wide range of disagreements back into one emotional field of humiliation and anger. That does not mean Germans suddenly agreed on everything. But it does mean that the tone of nationalist talk changed.

This is also where the East becomes relevant, as the feeling of injustice about the borders stemming from the treaty. Liulevicius shows how postwar Germany struggled to accept the new map and instead nurtured a determination to revise Eastern frontiers an ‘abiding struggle’ that expressed itself as a refusal to accept defeat.<sup>11</sup> In his account, interwar debates repeatedly voiced the idea that a future war could come if the Versailles order was not revised.<sup>12</sup> That is nationalism after Versailles: not merely attachment to Heimat,

but a politics organized around undoing the peace settlement. Even when this revisionism varied in intensity, it changed the baseline of what ‘national interest’ sounded like.

### **Conclusion: why Versailles was crucial to German nationalism**

I believe that Versailles was a major event in the evolution of German nationalism because it *reprogrammed* how nationalism worked. It turned defeat into a narrative of national shame, converted a legal clause into a moral accusation, and gave Germans across political aisles a shared language (“peace of shame,” Diktat, betrayal) that could unify them emotionally. At the same time, it sharpened that unity through scapegoating imaginary “stabbers”, forcing everyone to choose between being a nationalist or akin to the traitors who caused the shameful defeat. It also weaponized in the daily discourse by making nationalist resentment easier to intensify by linking it to everyday hardship and by feeding it with organized revisionist campaigns.

If I ask whether the treaty had a lasting effect on German nationalism, the answer is yes, not because it predestined any single later outcome (although it surely prepared the stage), but because it changed the shape of nationalist feeling and argument. After 1919, German nationalism was less about celebrating what Germany was and planning its future, but more about mourning what Germany had been denied and demanding that the denial be reversed.

### **Notes (sources with relevant page references)**

1. Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2008)
2. “Philipp Scheidemann’s Reichstag Speech Demanding Peace” (1917), *German History in Documents and Images* (GHDI), abstract and introduction (peace without annexations; contrast with Pan-German League’s “Siegfrieden”).
3. Smith, *Continuities*, PDF p. 48 (nationalism and ‘large cultural systems’).
4. “The Official Responsibility: The Treaty of Versailles, Article 231 (June 28, 1919),” GHDI (text of Article 231).
5. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (Random House, 2001), PDF p. 495 (Article 231 as liability basis; German ‘war guilt’ reading).
6. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, PDF p. 495 (honor framing in German rejection of Article 231).
7. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, PDF p. 506 (“peace of shame”; cross-party resonance).
8. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, PDF p. 506 (‘traitors at home’ / stabbed-in-the-back framing).
9. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, PDF p. 508 (Versailles as “Diktat” blamed for economic hardship).
10. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, PDF p. 507 (German Foreign Office “war guilt” section producing critical studies).
11. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford University Press, 2009)
12. Liulevicius, *German Myth of the East*, p. 26